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Abstract 
 
Southern Africa as a region requires a rallying point from where they can integrate and 
mobilize their resources in order to create a security community, which acts both as a 
deterrent to the outbreak of conflict and regional bloc to protect local industries from global 
forces. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) does not have the strong 
relationship which usually exists between states that share a common goal or interest. The 
study argues that the lack of leadership within the region accounts for the weak cooperative 
relationship that presently exists in Southern Africa. 
 
This study argues that regionalization does not come about unless the states in a particular 
region want it. It may come about through spontaneous or unintended convergence in terms 
of political regime, economic policy or security, but often one can identify a triggering 
political event which sets the process in motion. The study argues that the Development 
Corridors apparent in Southern Africa can act as the triggering event and have the promise to 
forge the most feasible cooperation amongst regional states. The phenomenon of Peace Parks 
rooted in the Spatial Development Initiatives, offer a unique type of regional integration 
embedded on traditional focal areas and Southern African Identity.  
 
This study intends to analyze the potential ability of regional hegemony to foster peace 
through development. The primary objective of this study consequently is to examine the role 
of regional hegemonies as tools for peace; using South Africa’s hegemony in Southern Africa 
as a case study. This study describes the importance of South Africa as a regional hegemon to 
lead the process of creating a peaceful co-existence in SADC. To achieve the research 
objectives the following questions have been formulated: What is South Africa’s role as a 
development partner in Southern Africa? The second research question asks how the political 
economy of regionalism is apparent in the Spatial Development Indicators (Development 
Corridors). Specifically what contribution could Spatial Development Initiatives make 
towards SADC’s regional integration objectives? The research questions provide an 
impression of major socio-political developments looming in the region and also seek to 
provide the required tools to analyze and understand what is going on in Southern Africa 
today. 
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Opsomming 
Die Suider-Afrikaanse streek het ’n definitiewe behoefte om ‘n sentrale punt te identifiseer 
waar beide integrasie kan plaasvind en hulpbronne gemobiliseer kan word om ’n veiligheids 
gemeenskap te skep. Dit kan as ’n definitiewe teenvoeter dien vir die onstaan van konflik en 
om plaaslike industrie te beskerm teen die soms negatiewe invloed van internasionale magte. 
Die Suider-Afrikaanse Ontwikkelings Gemeenskap (SAOG) het huidiglik nie ’n sterk 
verhouding wat tussen state met gemeenskaplike doelwitte en belange heers nie. Die kern 
argument van hierdie studie is dat die tekort aan leierskap binne die streek een van die 
hoofoorsake is vir die algemene swak samewerking wat tans bestaan in Suider-Afrika.  
 
Die studie argumenteer dat sogenaamde streeks/regionale integrasie nie tot stand kan kom 
tensy die state in ’n spesifieke streek ’n definitiewe behoefte daartoe het nie. Dit kan wel 
onstaan deur middel van ’n spontane samevloei van politieke regimes, ekonomiese beleid en 
veiligheid. Daar is soms egter ’n spesifieke gebeurtenis wat die proses laat onstaan. Die 
studie argumenteer dat die sogenaamde Ontwikkelings Deurgange (‘Development Corridors’) 
wat tans in Suider-Afrika ontwikkel as ’n moontlike vertrekpunt gesien kan word wat die 
beste kans bied om samewerking tussen state te bevorder. Die onstaan van Vredes Parke 
(‘Peace Parks’) gevestig binne die Ontwikkelings Deurgange, bied ’n unieke vorm van 
regionale integrasie in Suider-Afrika.  
 
Hierdie studie het ten doel om die potensiële moontlikheid van regionale hegemonie om 
vrede te bewerkstellig deur middel van ontwikkeling te ontleed. Die hoof doelwit van hierdie 
studie is om die rol van regionale hegemonie as instrument van vrede te ontleed. Die studie 
sal spesifiek die gevallestudie van Suid-Afrika se regionale hegemonie in Suider-Afrika 
ondersoek. Hierdie studie beskryf die belangrikheid van Suid-Afrika as ’n streeks moondheid 
om die leiding te neem om vreedsame samewerking binne die SAOG te bewerkstellig. Die 
volgende belangrike vrae is in hierdie studie gestel: Wat is Suid-Afrika se rol as ’n 
ontwikkelings-vennoot in Suider-Afrika? Die tweede vraag probeer vasstel tot watter mate 
die politieke ekonomie van regionale samewerking tans bestaan in die Omgewings 
Ontwikkelings Indikatore (die sogenaamde ‘Development Corridors’). Watter spesifieke 
bydraes kan hierdie inisiatiewe lewer om die SAOG se regionale integrasie doelwitte te 
bereik? Die vrae probeer ’n geheel indruk skep hoe die Omgewings-Ontwikkelings 
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Inisiatiewe (‘Spatial Development Initiatives’) tans bydra om ’n beter begrip te skep van 
huidige verwikkelinge in Suider-Afrika.  
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Chapter one 
Research Problem and Research Design 
 
1.1. Introduction of the study 
The nature of this study places it in the domain of International Relations (IR) because it is 
concerned about how a hegemon has an impact on a regions’ development. Brown (2005) 
clarifies that International Relations (upper case) is the academic study of international 
relations (lower case) which are cross-border transactions of all sort, that is economic, 
political, social and otherwise. The purpose of this research firmly places it within a certain 
terrain of IR, known as International Political Economy (IPE). Most textbooks offer a rather 
similar definition of IPE, that IPE is concerned with or “deals with how the world economy is 
organized politically” (Hettne; 1995:1). Jackson and Sorenson (2007) suggest a more 
particularistic understanding of IPE, that of it being political rules and regulations that 
provide a legal framework within which markets function. One can already see the intricate 
relationship between politics and economics settling in Jackson and Sorenson’s definition. In 
addition “man’s ability to participate intelligently in the evolution of his own system is 
dependent on his ability to perceive the whole” and the separation of politics and economics 
is toxic to the systematic understanding of the whole (Wallerstein; 1976:10). Some authors go 
as far as to claim that the separation between politics and economics is ‘artificial’ (Stephan, 
Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006). The New Regionalism Approach which provides the 
theoretical framework for this study moves away from the contemporary separation of 
politics and economics. 
 
An understanding of IR theories, Peace Studies and IPE specialized theories is necessary in 
order to locate the case without theoretical loopholes. The study, specifically probes in IR the 
effects that greater regional integration has on sustainable peace. The rationale behind 
choosing regional integration as a measure of analysis is the belief that some of the problems 
in Southern Africa stem from the way the region as individual units has been integrated into 
the global world economy and its continued participation (specifically its role as single 
market exporters). The second reasoning is dictated by the findings that economically 
integrated countries are more stable than autarkic nations and experience fewer civil wars (de 
Soysa and Wagner, 2003). Similarly, Harff (2003) demonstrates that economically open 
nations are less likely to experience genocides. 
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Southern Africa has abundant natural resources, but this wealth has not transformed the 
livelihoods of the population due to the continued instability and insecurity in the region. 
Insecurity in the region has been exacerbated by conflict dynamics and resulting in massive 
population displacements. Internal instability within countries of Southern Africa poses a 
threat to both regional security and regional development due to the spill over effects of 
domestic turmoil. Furthermore the decreased role of the state has meant that social welfare in 
the form of education, health care and general services have decreased further exacerbating 
the effects of insecurity. 
 
1.2. Aim of the study 
The primary aim of the study is to investigate the potential of South Africa as a regional 
hegemon to attain peace through development. Regionalization does not come about unless 
the states in a particular region want it. It may come about through a more or less 
spontaneous or unintended convergence in terms of political regime, economic policy or 
security, but often one can identify a triggering political event which sets the process in 
motion. The study thus will argue that the Development Corridors apparent in Southern 
Africa can act as the triggering event and have the promise to forge the most feasible 
cooperation amongst regional states. The regional hegemon in this study will be South Africa 
and the word hegemon refers to the deployment of power and persuasion by a dominant state 
to defend its region, avoid warfare and to promote economic stability, commerce and peace. 
It should be noted from the outset that there are two distinct ways to understand peace. 
According to the United Nations (UN) document An Agenda for Peace, peace building 
consists of a wide range of activities associated with capacity building, reconciliation, and 
societal transformation (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). This study advocates that peace building is a 
long-term process that occurs after violent conflict has slowed down or come to a halt. Thus, 
it is the phase of the peace process that takes place after peacemaking and peacekeeping. This 
study will adopt the second view of peace building (societal transformation) as it involves the 
process of development and long term human security. The dimension of peace building that 
occurs during conflicts; peacekeeping and peace accords lays beyond the scope of this study 
and will not be dealt with. It should be noted that a long term focus on peace building in 
Southern Africa involves the creation of collective security by member states. 
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Nathan (2004:1) argues that domestic stability, defined as the absence of large scale violence 
is a necessary condition for the establishment of a security community. In short there cannot 
be peace without guaranteeing simple human securities. Consequently the theoretical 
framework and vehicle for development used in this study is the New Regionalism Approach 
(NRA). The unit and the source of interest are the public goods of the region. The indivisible 
and non-excludable characteristics of public goods mean that any individual can enjoy a 
commodity (or condition) without diminishing others’ ability to enjoy it to the same extent 
and that no one can be excluded from that enjoyment (Mendez, Hamburg & Holl; 1999:366). 
The ‘public goods’ maintained, conferred and defended by hegemon’s include peace; access 
to international waterways and air spaces and laws and institutions for the protection of 
property rights and the enforcement of contractual agreements that transcend national legal 
systems (O’Brien & Williams, 2007).  
 
Public goods in Southern Africa and specifically for this study will be the developmental 
corridors. Two development corridors of interest are the Maputo Development Corridor, 
situated between Mozambique, South Africa, Swaziland and Lesotho. The focus of this 
corridor is mainly transport infrastructure, investment projects in mining, agriculture, and 
tourism. The second is the Transfrontier Parks also known as Peace Parks, located in 
Tanzania, the DRC, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, Namibia, Botswana, South Africa, Swaziland 
and Mozambique; its main focus is environmental protection and the conservation of wildlife. 
Tourism is one of the biggest industries in Southern Africa and it is mostly centred on 
wildlife and cultural heritage sites. The phenomenon of Transfrontier parks offer a unique 
type of regional integration embedded on traditional focal areas and Southern African 
Identity. This study will look at spatial development initiatives generally as well as the 
Transfrontier Parks specifically. Transfrontier Parks are also known as Peace Parks and the 
two phrases will be used interchangeably throughout this study. Peace Parks offer very 
interesting prospects for developing common values and identity through regional 
cooperation. 
 
The developmental corridor initiatives in SADC need to be viewed against the backdrop of a 
number of socio-economic imperatives that are facing the region. Most importantly the need 
to develop the regional economy in a manner that would make it far more diversified, 
stronger, and internationally competitive. This study seeks to investigate the multitude of 
state market and societal relations that exist within the Southern African regional space. More 
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specifically the research question probes how the agency of South Africa could be used as a 
catalyst for developmental purposes. Research to date is mainly based on the trade imbalance 
between South Africa and other states in the region. For definition of concepts please refer to 
the section on concepts and operations, (Chapter 2). 
 
1.3. Rationale of the study 
In theory, resource wealth should enable all countries to prosper while in practice, in some 
areas current patterns of conflict and war are killing disproportionate numbers of people 
living in countries or regions that are rich in certain natural resources (Boas, 2003). The 
nature of war in parts of Africa as well as elsewhere has fuelled concerns in some circles that 
the economies of these conflicts may play a crucial part in motivating and sustaining them 
(Collier, 2004). Greed and grievance are centered on the relationship civil society has with 
the material resources surrounding it (Collier, 2009). In cases of Southern Africa, Angola, 
and the DRC in particular, the tension that this relationship has had on the community has 
manifested itself in the creation of war economies. War is after all the continuation of politics 
by other means (Shaw, 2000 and Taylor; 2005:147). Establishing this constructed space as 
our point of departure the trajectory that this study seeks to establish is one that argues that 
for the establishment of peace, the tensions that exist between communities and their material 
surroundings need to be addressed. The mechanism in which this trajectory is established is 
rooted in the new regionalism approach. War economies are arguably established with the 
assumption that, there exists a higher chance of gain during war than in times of peace 
(Taylor, 2005). Thus, an antithesis to this would be to establish conditions under which a 
higher expected utility from peace exist than in times of war. The study argues that the 
development Corridors apparent in Southern Africa have the promise to forge the most 
feasible peaceful cooperation amongst SADC states. The study generally seeks to address the 
critical implications for ending resource wars within SADC. The study will attempt to 
establish that up to date South Africa, as the most feasible contender for regional leadership 
has not provided visionary leadership in Southern Africa. 
 
SADC does not have the strong relationship which usually exists between states that share a 
common goal or interest. The study argues that the lack of leadership within the region 
accounts for the weak cooperative relationship that presently exists in Southern Africa. 
Taylor (2005) argues that regionalization is usually an attempt to find an optimum size for the 
efficient performance of certain tasks. Leadership in this process involves a state, in this 
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study South Africa, to direct the affairs and actions of others in order to find the optimum size 
for the efficient performance of regional development. According to O’Toole 
(1996)leadership defines what the future should look like. The benefit of such a process from 
a functionalist perspective would encompass security through developmental cooperation for 
the region and its member states. 
 
1.4. Objective of the study 
Southern Africa as a region requires a rallying point from where they can integrate and 
mobilize their resources in order to create a security community, which acts both as a 
deterrent to the outbreak of conflict and regional block to protect local industries from global 
forces. South Africa’s economic and military might in the region provides that perfect point 
of departure needed for the building of a security community. Karl Deutsch in the 1950s 
conducted an inquiry into the means by which war has been eliminated through the formation 
of security communities (Nathan; 2004:1). A security community is defined as  
 
“A security community is a group of people, which has become “integrated”. By integration 
we mean the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of security” and of institutions and 
practices strong and widespread enough to assure…dependable expectations of “peaceful 
change” among its population. By sense of community we mean a belief…that common social 
problems must and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change” (Nathan; 2004:2) 
 
The significance of establishing a security community lies in the anchor that the interplay of 
intergovernmental interactions, institutions and identity reciprocate each other and are 
mutually reinforcing (Nathan, 2004). The primary objective of this study consequently is to 
examine the role of regional hegemonies as tools for peace; using South Africa’s hegemony 
in Southern Africa as a case study. This study describes the importance of South Africa as a 
regional hegemon to lead the process of creating a ‘security community’ through regional 
integration. Article 22(1) of the SADC Treaty provides for member states to conclude 
protocols to “spell out the objectives and scope of, and institutional mechanisms for co-
operation and integration” (Cillier; 1996:2). 
 
The study outlines which essential public goods the regional hegemon has to provide that will 
ensure that the people of the region perceive times of peace as sufficient and that it provides a 
higher utility compared to times of conflict on the long term. This study argues that 
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traditional security, defined as military security is beneficial in the short term and that the 
establishment of positive peace as defined by Galtung (1969) is a more sustainable way of 
eradicating insecurity (in its broadest meaning) among people of Southern Africa. The 
subsequent chapter (four) will argue that the Development Corridors apparent in Southern 
Africa have the promise to forge the most feasible cooperation amongst regional states. 
 
1.5 Research Question 
This study provides an overview of Southern African politics. To achieve the research 
objectives the following questions have been formulated: What is South Africa’s role as a 
development partner in Southern Africa? The research question provides an impression of 
major socio-political developments looming in the region and also seeks to provide the 
required tools to analyze and understand what is going on in Southern Africa today. The 
second research question asks how the political economy of regionalism is apparent in the 
spatial development Indicators (Development Corridors). Specifically what contribution 
could Spatial Development Initiatives make towards SADC’s regional integration 
objectives?The hypothesis of the study argues that the Spatial Development Initiative’s will 
have an impact on regional integration and that regional integration is in return a positive 
contributor to regional peace and security. 
 
The study and research question generally are motivated by the objectives set out in the 
SADC Treaty of 1992 mainly: What can be done to achieve a set goal in the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC), namely to create a stable and prosperous 
Southern Africa? The New Regionalism Approach provides a contemporary approach to 
analysing and theorising about the Southern African political economy. This study adopts the 
New Regionalism Approach to investigate South Africa’s role in critically analysing different 
political and economic projects in the Southern African region specifically the Spatial 
Development Initiatives. 
 
1.6 Significance of the study 
The relevance of this study is to assist in the evaluation and assessment of the importance of a 
regional hegemon as a tool for peace through development in Africa. The study thus will 
argue that the Development Corridors apparent in Southern Africa can act as the triggering 
event in SADC and have the promise to forge the most feasible cooperation amongst regional 
states. A regional hegemon may contribute to the attainment and achievement of the set goal 
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in Article 5, Chapter 3 of the SADC treaty of 1992, namely to create a stable and prosperous 
southern Africa, which remain intrinsically linked to the livelihoods of the people of the 
region. In sub-Saharan Africa, both the number of poor and the poverty rate have increased in 
some of the more vulnerable and low growth economies since 1990 (MDG; 2009:4). 
Southern Africa particularly is poor by international standards. Most of the SADC member 
states are ranked in the low income or lower-middle-income categories used by the World 
Bank and defined in terms of gross national income per capita. The SADC was established in 
1992 with a mandate to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace, security 
and the evolution of common political values and institutions (Nathan; 2006: 605). A study of 
this nature seeks to address this reality and offer departure points in addressing poverty in the 
region. 
 
In addition, research to date is mainly based on the trade imbalance between South Africa and 
other states in the region. The fields of International Political Economy and Security Studies 
are largely focused on establishment of institutions and the achievement of interstate policy 
frameworks (South African Customs Union-SACU, Organ for Politics, Defence and Security 
Cooperation-OPDSC). This study investigates the multitude of state market and societal 
relations that exist within the Southern African regional space. More specifically the research 
question probes how the agency of South Africa could be used as a catalyst for 
developmental purposes. The Peace Parks in Southern Africa remain neglected in IR analysis 
of regional public goods as IR is restricted by its state-centric view of inter-state relations. 
This form of study will contribute to the new weave world approach of regionalism which 
remains understudied in countries outside Europe and North America. 
 
1.7 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
1.7.1 Research Approach 
This research is based on the Critical Social Science Approach (CSSA). This is one of the 
approaches recommended by Neuman (2006:94) where he states that it is a technique in 
social research that emphasises combating surface level distortions and multiple levels of 
reality and value based activism for human empowerment. South Africa’s hegemonic 
dominance in the region will be evaluated and questions of its capability and willingness to 
spear head regional development have been posed. Surface level distortions and multiple 
level realities are specifically the idea that regional understanding at multiple dimensions will 
help researchers understand human security better and thus be better able to find possible 
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solutions for regional development. The research will rely mainly on secondary data sources. 
The theoretic framework adopted by this study is the New Regionalism Approach (NRA). 
The NRA is a multidimensional societal process that incorporates a variety of non-state 
actors. The NRA is ‘multifaceted’ and is a ‘voluntary process from emerging regions, where 
the constituent states experience the imperative of cooperation in order to tackle global 
challenges’ (Soderbaum; 2006:xii). The most important aspect of the NRA specifically for 
this study is the notion of developmental regionalism which is state led. 
 
A research methodology that is appropriate for this study is a qualitative design. The research 
design adopted by this study is a case study. It will particularly be of an idiographic strategy -
this is to say that the study is “solely interested in understanding the particular and specific 
event or case within its own context” (Babbie & Mouton; 2007:272). According to Babbie 
and Mouton (2007), there are six types of case studies; this research finds one suitable one, 
studies of countries and nations which is typical in international and comparative politics 
where the focus is on a country or bloc of countries. This study’s focus will be on the SADC 
region in relation to South Africa’s role in it. 
 
Every chapter in this study will include a separate evaluation of the findings and the 
relevance thereof to an understanding of South Africa’s role in the region. Finally an 
overarching evaluation of the findings in all chapters of the study will draw the various 
chapters together. 
 
1.7.2 Research Design 
Theoretical insights of any study is enabled and hampered by the conceptual framework of 
the discipline from which it originates. Subject specific variables such as the level or unit of 
analysis necessarily define the parameters of the inquiry. The new regionalism approach 
moves away from disciplinary boundaries, specifically the classical notion of viewing the 
state as the only actor in international relations. In so doing it avoids limiting the observations 
of Southern Africa to reflect only a presupposed set of security and developmental variables. 
 
The study is aimed at providing answers to address the issues pertaining to regional 
development generally and peaceful integration specifically. This study has identified the 
Spatial Development Initiatives (Development Corridors) as the common values and 
initiatives that the region could use as a springboard for development and integration. 
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Development initiatives are tailored at formally creating a regional security community in 
which further development could help in the eradication of inequality, poverty and meeting 
other MDG’s set out for 2015. This study consists of qualitative research and analysis 
although quantitative data will be used to support the analysis in some instances. South 
Africa’s hegemony will be examined in an descriptive and explorative manner. This study is 
not based on fieldwork or questionnaires. The research design is a case study and is based on 
studies of existing literature on Southern Africa and on using existing statistics during the 
presentation and analysis of data (Neuman; 2006:161). The study is known as ‘non-reactive 
research’ as the people being studied are not aware that they are being explored; rather 
evidence will be collected from government (South African) and international agencies (such 
as UNDP and SADC) reports (Neuman; 2006:320). The aim is to contribute to the growing 
literature on multivariate approaches to existing IR theory, and to find valuable sources of 
literature contribution to the development and construction of security communities in 
Southern Africa. The type of study conducted is a non-empirical study of Southern Africa; 
data that has been previously collected has been used in order to address the question of 
hegemony as a tool for sustainable peace. 
 
1.7.3 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis in this study is South Africa, as it acts as the regional hegemon for the 
purpose of this study. The study seeks to make an evaluation of South Africa’s role in the 
development corridors in Southern Africa specifically. Units of analysis are typically the 
units of observation (Babbie & Mouton; 2005:84). South Africa as a country will be 
evaluated in order to see whether it has the capacity to successfully lead a hegemonic project 
of regional development. Nathan’s (2004) assertion of the importance of domestic stability as 
a prerequisite for the establishment of a security community will be crucial in this 
examination.  
 
1.7.4 Level of analysis 
The study uses a collective of countries as its level of analysis; the countries in the Southern 
African region to be specific. In academic terms the level of analysis is called meso as it is 
neither national nor global but in-between (Babbie & Mouton; 2005:84). 
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1.7.5 Time Dimension 
This study has taken multiple observations of the same cases over the period 1994-2009. In 
particular the rise of South Africa as a regional power and how that has directly influence the 
achievement or maintenance of peace in the region. The years 1994 and 2009 have been 
chosen purely on the basis that it allows the study to capture the most recent developments in 
the region and of academic analyses over the fifteen year interval. 
 
1.7.6 Data Collection 
The study is descriptive in its nature and an evaluation of South Africa’s role in the 
development corridors in Southern Africa specifically. As this study wishes to make an 
evaluation it will entail the use of scientific methods to analyse the implementation and 
outcomes of SADC’s development programs. The study according to Rutman (1984:11) in 
(Babbie & Mounton; 2006:336) can be classified as a case whereby an intervention is 
mounted in order to meet some recognised social need or to solve an identified problem. “An 
evaluation research addresses some of the most fundamental and important issues that arise 
from the intervention that human beings make in the world” (Babbie & Mounton; 2006:336). 
This study’s aim is to improve the human condition. The study is mainly an evaluation and 
data collected, mainly through secondary data sources, will only serve as an illustration to 
strengthen the overall thesis. 
 
1.7.7 Sampling 
As the study is an evaluation of South Africa’s role within the framework of developmental 
corridors in Southern Africa, no particular sampling technique has been used. The study is 
not based on fieldwork or questionnaires. The study undertakes a narrow focus on South 
Africa’s role and uses literature to review the objectives of regional development in southern 
Africa. 
 
1.8 Validity and reliability of the study 
The study has aimed at achieving content validity and measurement reliability this will be 
done in order to ensure that the research remains objective and replicable. Perfect validity and 
reliability are impossible to achieve but the aim of this study is to ensure that their criterion is 
fulfilled as much as possible in order for future researches to replicate this study. 
Measurement reliability means that the results produced by a study do not vary because of 
characteristics of the measurement process (Neuman; 2006:188). Content validity requires 
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that a study represent all aspects of the conceptual definition of a construct so as to address 
the objectives of the study. 
 
1.9 Limitations of the study 
The study is mainly conducted through secondary data analysis and thus issues of financial 
constraints and travelling will not be relevant to the study. Literature on the specific topic 
however is still in its infancy and finding material might prove challenging at times. 
Development Corridors and research on it is mainly done through what is called ‘applied 
research’. Applied research is designed to offer practical solutions to a concrete problem; it is 
often used by practitioners who want to find quick results that can be used in the short term 
(Neuman; 2006:25). Research that seeks to build on theory is limited on the subject. This 
study would contribute in the framing of Southern African relations, particularly in the 
understanding of the potential that exist in the Development Corridors. Its approach could be 
used in examining the weakness of formal regionalization projects in SADC and actually 
create commonly shared values of integration regionally. The aim of the study is to 
investigate the feasibility of South Africa to lead a process of regional integration that will 
ensure sustainable peace in Southern Africa. Such a study’s findings will contribute to the 
studies of security and development in an effort to address the conundrum of absolute poverty 
in particular and the question of development in general. A more detailed focus on the study’s 
limitation is given in chapter five. 
 
1.10 Chapter Outline 
Chapter one is of a methodological nature and provides an introduction and formulation of 
the research question and objectives. This chapter demarcates the study and provides the 
methodology adopted by the research (Babbie & Mouton, 2005). 
 
Chapter two provides an overview of the key concepts related to the study. Its main focus is 
the theoretical framework of the study followed by the literature review. The literature review 
that forms part of this chapter provides an overview of the sources used in undertaking this 
study. 
 
Chapter three focuses upon South Africa’s role in the region with the view of presenting and 
analysing the data in a way that describes the hegemonic status of South Africa and how and 
why it engages with the Southern African region. An in-depth background review will be 
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done on Southern Africa as a region since 1994 specifically looking at its economic growth 
and probing the question of insecurity. 
 
Chapter four focuses on the development corridors, mainly Spatial Development Initiatives 
(SDIs) and how they symbolise bottom up regionalism. An overview of the Maputo 
Development Corridor will be given. An in-depth discussion of the Transfrontier parks and 
their potential for socio-economic development in Southern Africa will be discussed.  South 
Africa’s role in the SDI will be addressed in this chapter. The theory of new regionalism will 
be critically evaluated as it transcends all levels of regionalism. This form of regionalism is 
state led but aimed at the attainment of human security. 
 
Chapter five provides an evaluation and summary of the key findings that address the 
research question posed in chapter one. This includes an assessment of South Africa’s ability 
to create a security community and will culminate into the final conclusion.  
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Chapter Two 
Theoretical Framework and Literature Review 
 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter will present the theoretical framework together with the literature review as 
knowledge that was gathered in the literature. The theory of New Regionalism Approach will 
form the bases of the overall studies analysis. The theory of security communities will be 
used for purposes of discussion and the strengthening of the New Regionalism Approaches 
argument. The first section of this chapter will outline the different typologies and evolution 
of regionalism. The New Regionalism Approach from here on NRA will be discussed in 
depth. This study generally seeks to investigate the ability of South Africa to attain peace 
through development. The point of departure used is the fundamental interactions of formal 
and informal micro regionalism at various geographical levels in Southern Africa. 
 
The second section of this chapter deals with the conceptualisation of South Africa as a 
hegemon. Literature is reviewed on the different viewpoints of scholars regarding the status 
of South Africa as a regional hegemon. Cox in (Schouten; 2009:7) argues that “hegemony as 
a term used traditionally in international relations meant the supremacy of one major state 
power over others and perhaps the acceptance of that supremacy by the others”. Gramsci’s 
thinking brings culture and ideas alongside material force into the concept of hegemony. 
 
“Hegemony in this Gramscian sense means that the great mass of mankind in a particular area or 
part of the world regard the existing structure of power and authority as established, natural and 
legitimate. Hegemony is expanded when other people come to accept those conditions as natural. 
Hegemony is weakened and eroded when the legitimacy of the power structure is called into 
question and an alternative order seems possible and desirable” (Schouten; 2009:7).  
 
This section is concluded by making the point on the importance of labelling South Africa as 
a hegemon. 
 
The third section of this chapter discusses the concept of peace and security. Peace and 
security are the objectives that the regional hegemon, South Africa will seek to achieve 
through the Spatial Development Initiatives (SDI); apparent in the political economy of 
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Southern Africa. This study applies quantitative and qualitative data as it makes use of 
secondary material todescribe and analyses the issue of South Africa’s role in Southern 
Africa after the first democratic election in 1994. Secondary sources will be reinterpreted as 
no empirical research was done. The conclusion will provide the summary of the literature 
reviewed and how it relates to the general research question. 
 
2.2 Theoretical framework of the study 
UN secretary general Boutros Ghali; asserted that development was a fundamental human 
right and is intrinsically linked to peace and human security (Boutros-Ghali, 1992). The 
Millennium Development Goal’s evolved into the blueprint by which the international 
community sought to achieve peace and security. Social science and general research have 
traditionally associated peace and security to state-centric threats to the nation state. Hentz 
(2003:3) argues that the classical definition of security studies is the study of the threat, the 
use and the control of military force. International Relations, particularly, has privileged the 
state in traditional security studies. Realpolitik and realism predominantly have seen security 
in terms of state security, the consequence of which is that human security is neglected.  
 
The orthodox approach to security dates back to the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) which laid 
the basis for the modern European State based on the principles of territorial integrity and 
state sovereignty. This approach rests on three central assumptions namely, the referent 
object of security is the Westphalia type of state, that security threats to this state come from 
other states (i.e. are external) and that the only valid security threats are military threats 
(Bakhit; 2002:3). The prime concern of this approach is the relationship between the 
individual and the state. However the end of Cold War led to the reduction in armed conflicts 
between states in the international system. At the same time, the 1990s saw an increase in 
civil wars, as well as international efforts to reach peace agreements. Alongside peace 
building, there has also evolved the concept of human security, which has a two-fold origin. 
On the one hand, it stems from the studies promoted since the 1990s by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP). On the other hand, from critical perspectives on the 
orthodox concept of security based on the role of the state and its armed forces for deterrence 
and protection of sovereignty and national interests (Nathan, 2004). According to the Atlas of 
Human Security (2005:2), the broad concept of human security, first outlined in the 1994 
Human Development Report from UNDP rests on two pillars: freedom from want and 
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freedom from fear. On the other hand the narrow concept focuses on freedom from violence, 
both criminal and political. A detailed typology of security is discussed in section 2.3.4.2 
 
In his attempt to explain insecurity in the African Great Lakes, Bakhit (2002:21-22) stresses 
the limitations of the state-centric orientation of both Third World Critique of security 
focusing on military and political threat and the ‘Broadening Critique’ emphasizing economic 
threat. According to him, even a happy marriage of the two concepts cannot explain 
insecurity in this region. Providing a starting point in order to capture insecurity in the Great 
Lakes region, he argues that security is what people make of it.  
 
2.2.1 Theories of Regionalism 
Although theories of regionalism are the central part of this section, it would be premature to 
discuss regionalism only at an abstract level. It is important to consider other factors such as 
its emergence in world politics, its successes, failures, criticism, relevance and other aspects 
that would give us a holistic understanding. All of this is to be done very briefly, as the 
principal part of this section is the theoretical framework. There is no consensus as to what 
led to the emergence of regionalism in world politics. The two main contending views 
amongst scholars, is that regionalism came about to accelerate globalization, others view it as 
a response to globalization (Stephan, Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006).  
 
The emergence of regionalism dates back to post-WWI Europe with the increased 
‘cooperation’ between European states, mainly along economic and financial lines but later 
on political, legal and even on military agreements (Brown, 2005). This corroborates with the 
previous analysis of pluralism in the 1960s and 1970s, which challenged realism as the main 
International Relations theory. The criticisms that have been levelled against regionalism 
include its role in ‘weakening’ the state and its sovereignty in particular (Baylis, Smith and 
Owens; 2005:592-594). Regionalism or regional integration can occur for many reasons and 
in many ways, the most common reason and manner throughout history has been economic 
integration. Literature traditionally displays two kinds of integration, state-led and market-led 
integration (Stephan, Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006 and Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008). 
In simple terms, state-led integration focuses on arrangements in infrastructure, energy, 
health and other socio-politico matters; whereas market-led integration gives preference to 
commercialism and is not obliged to have common interests with trading states in its region. 
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The following sub section will give detailed explanation of the two forms of regionalism 
dealt with in this study. 
 
2.2.1.2 Open regionalism 
The theory of open regionalism is embedded in liberal views of international organization. It 
seeks to promote a market-led form of regional integration, with the functionalist agenda of 
promoting non-state actors to be key role players (Brown, 2005). Free trade agreements 
(FTAs), common market, customs unions, economic and monetary unions are given 
preference over political ties within the countries in the region (Stephan et al., 2006; Baylis et 
al., 2008) to promote integration. This theory assumes that all the other forms will take place 
as a result in economic strength, in what is known as the ‘spill over effect’. Advocates of this 
theory argue that there is no other way of effectively responding to globalization other than 
this regionalism (Stephan et al., 2006). Southern Africa and Sub Saharan Africa generally 
have adopted open regionalism as a strategy for regional development and economic 
development. It has long been suggested that there is no single form of integration. The next 
theory will provide understanding of the other prominent form - state-led integration.  
 
 2.2.1.3 Developmental integration  
The state-led form of integration is also known as Developmental Integration as its disciples 
proclaim that it provides real interaction between states in a region (Stephan et al., 2006 and 
Baylis et al., 2008). Developmental integration wishes to see the state being at the forefront 
of integration, under the belief that the state will promote national instead of private agendas 
that define the private sector (Stephan et al., 2006). Such characteristics have been adopted 
by this study as it seeks to investigate how South Africa can lead the process of regional 
development in southern Africa. It is evident that development regionalism is not only 
different but also diametrically opposed to the former type of integration. What is important 
though is that it notes the importance of the social, economic and other forces but upholds 
that it should be state-led because if it were to be private-sector led, then there would be 
countries that are not as industrially advanced as others in any region and these would be 
victims of their fellow neighbouring countries. Baylis et al (2008), claim that developmental 
integration will create a common ideology, sense of unity across the region, and other forms 
of identity-politics which would strengthen over and beyond economic relations.  
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2.2.2 Old Regionalism 
Modern world history is in essence the history of an increasingly globalized world. This 
history is not teleological in the sense that it “assumes the existence of an inexorable 
historical process leading to a universal human community” (McGrew; 1993:73). Rather it 
can be seen as the interaction of discontinuous dialectical processes that consist in “mutually 
opposed tendencies” (Giddens; 1990:64 in McGrew 1993:73). In the modern era Europe 
provides the most successful example of market led regionalism. Hass’s (1964) concept of 
functional spillover represents a turning point in the development of regionalism literature 
and a model which African leaders have tended to adopt. Neo-functionalism builds on the 
nexus of politics and economics moving away from the previous functional view of 
privileging economics while separating it from the political (Hass, 1964). The structural and 
functional implication of the marriage of politics and economics is argued to inevitably lead 
to greater degrees of cooperation, coordination and integration.  Older forms of regionalism 
were limited by the fact that new independent countries in the developing world were not 
willing to yield their states’ sovereignty. 
 
In illustration of the old regionalism Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea, apart from being in 
the Manor River Union, are also part of the Economic Community for West Africa 
(ECOWAS). As part of a community of states, conflicts in one state become a problem of the 
regional organization. In this sense, the moment trouble started in one of the member states, it 
became a regional problem. Because the ECOWAS leadership found it to be their problem 
they deployed a peace keeping mission to Liberia in 1990-97 and again in 2003 and in Sierra 
Leone from 1993-2000 (Aning; 2004:533). The actual response itself meant that those 
countries contributing troops to the ECOMOG where now brought into the conflict which in 
actuality meant the conflict had gone beyond the borders of the countries concerned. It is 
important to point out that while the ECOMOG mission’s intervention meant regionalizing 
the conflict, it so happens that a lot of learning happened from the experience of the 
intervention. The conflict therefore had lasting consequences on the regional organization in 
terms of organizing and running peace keeping operations. This intervention was the first 
African intervention to an African conflict. According to Pitts (1999:1-19), 
 
… this military intervention has been - widely and justly - criticized for its many deficiencies, but 
it also is a highly significant development. It represents the first effort by an African sub-regional 
organization to conduct military peace operations. It reflects an African attempt to address an 
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African conflict situation without waiting for the assistance of external patrons. And while 
pessimists may point to its limited effectiveness, it takes but little vision to see this intervention as 
a harbinger of potential African solutions to some of Africa’s pressing security problems 
 
The Liberia and Sierra Leone conflict, involved at least two regions, and possibly a third. 
First, it was the Manor River Union, and then secondly ECOWAS. If we have to use the logic 
of membership as meaning an entity, we would go as far as saying that the AU (then OAU) 
was also affected. These conflicts were continental problems so to say. 
 
The war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) in Southern Africa acts as a good 
illustration of regionalized wars, involves several neighboring states, and has linked political 
and economic developments in the Great Lakes and Southern Africa regions, creating 
“regionalizations within a broader ‘regionalization of African wars’” (Taylor; 2005:158). 
Concerning the conflict in Democratic Republic of Congo, William Reno (Reno quoted in 
Taylor; 2005:154) argues that: 
 
“The problem for Congolese is not necessarily the weakness of their organizations of their 
demands but that their rulers have been able to dominate the country’s abundant natural 
resources and to call on a wide array of outsiders to help them do so”. 
 
In 1996, the war was driven by strong regional interests as the DRC insurgent groups 
received decisive military support from Rwanda and Uganda in order to overthrown Kabila  
whom they had installed as Congo’s president. Rwanda and Uganda once more conceived the 
power holders in Kinshasa as a threat to their security (Tull; 2007:116-117).The region power 
play in this case is facilitate by the Tutsi-based network of military and economic power in 
order to guarantee their interests. The attractiveness of the new regionalism paradigm is that 
it allows both the informal and the formal to co-exist which gives a much fuller meaning to 
the situation. 
 
2.2.3 The New Regionalism 
Bjorn Hettne is the pioneer of the new regionalism paradigm (Taylor; 2005:148). Hettne 
defines new regionalism ‘as a multidimensional form of integration which includes 
economic, political, social and cultural aspects…’ (Taylor; 2005:146). The main differences 
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between this kind of regionalism and the so called “old regionalism” are the actors. The “old 
regionalism” is state-centric and looks at the formal agreements and memorandums signed by 
states for cooperation in various areas such as economic, political, security and defense and 
other areas. The “New Regionalism” on the other hand is more informal and includes more 
than states; each of the actors are consistently relating with more than one actor at any one 
time. It includes multinational corporations, individuals and states interacting within each 
other. These different forms can be differentiated by the processes that bring them about. 
According to Taylor (2005:149): 
 
 ‘Regionalism’ refers to the often formal projects with particular plans and strategies that often 
lead to institutional arrangements. ‘Regionalization on the other hand refers to the actual 
processes that result in forms of cooperation, integration, connectivity and convergence within a 
particular cross-national territorial area. Orthodox approaches to regionalizing have invariably 
neglected this latter, often more informal, though less tangible, set of processes… 
 
In other words, among and within the fanfare that goes on with formal collaboration and or 
disagreements within regional organizations and among and between countries, there are 
other processes just as important that are going on out of the public eye which nevertheless 
are just as important in shaping the direction of affairs between states. Taylor (2005:149) 
again points out that “…such regionalisms involve the participation of a multitude of actors, 
both ‘state’…and non-state players”. This approach is essential, particularly in Africa, as 
much of the social and economic interconnectedness remain at the nexus of formal/informal, 
legal/illegal, nation/global and so on, constituting what has been called the three economies 
of Africa (Freeman quoted in Taylor; 2005:149). Hettne (1993) argues that the NRA sees 
regionalism as the return of the political and the need to control the transnational context 
(Hettne; 1993:212). Put simply the NRA is a defense mechanism against the effects of 
globalisation (Hentz; 2003:11). The NRA has four themes that shape it. The first is the 
relationship between regionalization and globalization. The second while the state plays an 
important role it is no longer the only actor (Hentz; 2003:12). Third regionalization cannot be 
understood without understanding the dynamics of local and global interactions (Hentz; 
2003:12). Finally the move away from neo-functionalism and the ushering in of a new world 
perspective defines the new regionalism approach (Hentz; 2003:12). 
 
20 
 
The NRA is distinct in its move away from focusing solely on the state for security, 
development and peace building. The NRA is constructivist in nature and critical as it seeks 
to break away from conservative state-centric approaches. One of the defining characteristics 
of the NRA is its construction of scale and level measures when analyzing conflict, which is a 
precursor to the achievement of peace. Other scholars, such as Carim (1995:53) argue that the 
alternative to state-centric analysis is the diffusion of power from states to local and regional 
communities. The regional mechanisms created to address such threats are ultimately the 
building blocks for greater regional, national and individual security (Carim; 1995:53-65). 
Literature on geographic levels has to be understood as belonging to the school of ‘post 
modernist’ studies and social space within political science. Thus its theoretical framework 
can be located in the works of social constructivists who would argue that scale and 
geographical levels are socially constructed political spaces in which social realities are to be 
understood (Marston; 2000:221). “The simplest definition of scale that is given in The 
dictionary of human geography (Johnston et al., 1994) is that it is a ‘level of representation” 
(Marston; 2000: 220). The concept of scale describes a level that may, and often does, 
correspond to a geographical level, but which is socially constructed and whose existence 
lays primarily in common perceptions. For Marston, level is one facet of scale. Conceived of 
as operational scale, level denotes where the processes considered relevant take place. 
 
As social facts, regions are continuously constructed through discourses and social practices. 
These processes also entail a continuous de-construction and re-construction, implying that 
the meanings of regions, scales and levels are never fixed but volatile and fluctuating (Jessop; 
2005: 226; Marston; 2000:220). Seen as a social construction, a particular (region) scale not 
only refers to a geographical level of analysis. More importantly it also delineates firstly a 
system which is ordered by a specific logic or set of rules involving discourses, interactions, 
decision-making processes. Thus the new regionalism approach is the conceptual space in 
which levels are to be understood and measured. In Southern Africa the establishment of the 
SADC signified a move by regional members to find common solutions to regional problems. 
The mandate of the SADC was to promote economic integration, poverty alleviation, peace 
and security (Nathan; 2004:265). Nathan (2004) however argues that from a retrospective 
perspective SADC has failed to pursue and achieve its mandate. Nathan (2004) argues that 
the limitation of state-centric perspectives hindered the achievement of the SADC mandate; 
specifically that of peace and security, which remain the centre piece of this study. 
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Nathan (2004:273) notes that the “development of common political values in the interest of 
stability integration and community building is one of SADC’s primary goals and was part of 
the rationale for its establishment”. This study has identified the Spatial Development 
Initiatives (Development Corridors) as the common values and initiatives that the region 
could use as a springboard for development and integration. The SDIs offered the opportunity 
for the relationship between top down and bottom up integration to be explored, more 
specifically how they interact in the same constructed space. Space and spatial initiatives 
remain fundamental buzzwords and concepts in the new regionalism approach. Their 
significance comes to light when questions of ‘for who, by whom and for what’ is 
development (regionally) tailored for (Soderbaum, 2006). 
 
2.2.4 Summary of regionalism 
A main concluding point in Political economy of regions and regionalism (Boås et al.; 
2005:168) is that “regions seem to at least be competing with states as one of the main 
ordering principles”. This challenge of the nation state as the main unit of governance is, 
linked to a constructivist notion of space, which is also reflected in the concept of imagined 
regions (Boås et al.; 2005:173). Where states, at least in a strict Weberian sense, are rational 
stable units comprised of rational institutions, political structures, procedures and mandates, 
regions can be understood more as spaces under continuing construction and deconstruction 
(Boås et al.; 2005:1).This network oriented perspective paves the way for analyzing many 
different scales of development, which may prove crucial if the analysis is going to serve as a 
basis for planning intervention. On the basis of reading The social construction of scale 
(Marston, 2000) I understand the concept and construction of scale, on the one hand, as a part 
of an analytical approach to understanding different levels of processes in which power is 
distributed, and on the other hand, as a tool for gaining power. Today a lot of real politics is 
played out in complex power games with numerous actors, local as well as regional, national 
and international. Construction of scale is in this context a highly political matter, since the 
basis of addressing and intervening in regional building will partly depend on the 
construction and definition of scale. That is, it is important to not limit the focus to the level 
of the nation state. 
 
Moreover, states differ so much from one another that it does not really make sense to 
operate with the concept of state as a universal unit. What is called states could be seen as 
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different manifestations of power relations, which in turn also are affected by other (also non-
state) actors. My argument here is not that it is irrelevant to analyze state institutions and 
practices in order to understand power distribution, but that it is necessary to understand the 
state (whether actually existing or only existing in a legitimizing rhetoric) as a part of more 
far-reaching and complex struggles for influence. The New Regionalism approach argues for 
developmental regionalism which is state led, the degree of separation is based on the 
changing role of the state within regionalism discourse. This way of understanding the role of 
states would be in line with the constructivist approach to scale presented both by Massey 
(1993) and Crump (2002), where the latter actually stresses the importance of the state: 
“Local politics are assumed to be the exclusive province of local political institutions, and 
national-scale political activity is viewed as the purview of the national state” (Crump; 
2002:245). In sum, the new regionalism approach includes economic, political, social and 
cultural aspects, and goes far beyond free trade. Rather, the political ambition of establishing 
regional coherence and regional identity seems to be of primary importance. 
 
2.1 Conceptualisation 
2.3.1 Hegemony  
The word hegemony was derived from the Greek word egemonia, which itself comes from 
egemon meaning ‘leader, ruler, often in the sense of a state other than his own’ (Williams; 
1977: 144). In the 19th Century hegemony has been used to indicate ‘political predominance, 
usually of one state over another’ (Williams; 1977:144). Robert Cox has emphasized that, 
economic and military superiority of a given state within a region is an insufficient source of 
coercive power to ensure acceptance of hegemony (Cox; 1996:99). Rather, to be effective 
hegemony requires consent amongst the weaker states built around the acceptance and 
internalization of a universalizing ideology. Structural dominance is distinguished by Cox 
from the more limited sense of dominance that is understood solely in terms of material 
power as presented by neo-realists and structuralist (Cox; 1996:251). Cox argues that the 
international community plays an important role in fostering recognition of a hegemon amidst 
any reluctance to do so by the hegemon’s neighboring states. Nel, van der Westhuisen and 
Taylor (2001) are subscribers of Cox’s view on hegemonic acceptance. 
 
Hegemony is a concept that has often been interpreted in different ways by different analysts. 
Landsburg; 2003:173) argues that hegemony conjures up negative perspectives of bullying 
and dominance, basically that of forceful cohesion. The technical definition of hegemon he 
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argues is less value laden and does not necessarily have negative connotations (Landsburg et 
al; 2003:173). Hegomonia represents a system of leadership where power is based on 
domination as much as cooptation (Danial Bash quoted in Landsburg et al 2003). Graham 
Evans and Jeffery Newham (1990) argue that hegemony entails primacy or leadership. 
Immanuel Wallenstein, a structuralist writer, considers a state hegemonic when it has 
achieved superiority over production, commerce and finance. Wallenstein (1980) argues that 
hegemony entails dominance so great that the nation state is capable of competing effectively 
in the domestic markets of its competitors (Sanderson; 1995:196). Hegemony is now defined, 
as a situation in which “one state is powerful enough to maintain the essential rules governing 
inter-states relations, and willing to do so” (Keohane; 1996:287). Hegemonic powers must 
have control over raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets and 
competitive advantages in the production of highly valued goods (Gilpin; 1986). 
 
Wallerstein (1980) argues that there have only been three instances of hegemony in the world 
economy and have relatively been few and far in-between. Hegemons’ in the world system 
have been the Dutch Republic (1625-1672), Great Britain (1815-1873) and the United States 
(1945-1965) (Sanderson; 1995:196). Christopher Chase-Dunn (1981) argues that four factors 
have been basic in the characteristics of world system hegemony. The first one is geographic 
location. A second characteristic is that hegemony develops technologies that enable more 
efficiency in production. Hegemons’ have diversified and highly capital intensive agriculture 
and industries. Finally, the state has played an active role in the development of the 
hegemonic states (Chase-Dunn, 1981). Hopkins and Wallerstein (1982) note that hegemonic 
position is short lived. Hegemons start to decline the moment it achieves hegemony. The 
United States has been the most sophisticated hegemony to date but that fact has coincided 
with the fact that it is also the shortest lived hegemony. Wallenstein (1982) argues the reasons 
why hegemonic decline happens instantly is the ‘cost of hegemony’ 
 
Keohane (1996) and Gilpin (1987) argue that in the international system states can attain 
hegemonies in their regions. A hegemon can be regional like Nigeria in West Africa or 
continental like Brazil in South America. Some regional hegemons like Japan and China are 
trying to create security communities in Asia. Germany and the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
under the leadership of the U.S, are also engaged in shaping the security of Europe. Regional 
hegemons share the same traits as world hegemons as discussed by Wallerstein (1980) and 
Sanderson (1995). David Myers (1991:5) defines regional hegemon as states which possess 
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power sufficient to dominate subordinate state systems (subsystems). Edward Mansfield 
argues that hegemon is “the holding by one state of a preponderance of power in the 
international system or a regional subsystem, so that it can single handedly dominate the rules 
and arrangements by which international and regional political and economic relations are 
conducted” (1992:3-15). Hegemons actively construct rule-making bodies and institutions 
that formalize their dominant position; at the same time they provide stability and the promise 
of prosperity as a trade-off for adherence to their dominance by lesser states. Hegemonic 
status rests on the ability to wield power in non-coercive ways with the consent of other states 
and the ability to pay military and economic costs are critical factors in exercising hegemony. 
In the case of regional groupings, the theory of hegemonic leadership implies that 
regionalism would develop ‘more fully in those areas of the world in which there is a local 
hegemon able to create and maintain regional economic institutions’ and will not progress ‘in 
those areas where hegemonic leadership is less visible’ (Grieco; 1997:173). 
 
South African hegemony is evident when one looks at its military and economic indicators 
relative to the Southern African region. Its biggest criticism however comes from the fact that 
it has not satisfied the third Gramscian criteria of leadership. A detailed discussion of South 
Africa’s lack of leadership can be found in section 2.33. 
 
2.3.2 Hegemonic Stability 
Charles Kindleberger set initially the theory of hegemonic stability, stating that an open and 
liberal world economy requires the existence of a hegemonic or dominant power (Gilpin; 
1987:72). According to Keohane (1996:287), the theory of hegemonic stability, as applied to 
the world political economy defines hegemony as a preponderance of material resources. 
Four sets of resources are especially important. Hegemonic powers must have control over 
raw materials, control over sources of capital, control over markets and competitive 
advantages in the production of highly valued goods (Gilpin, 1987). This theory predicts that 
the more one such power dominates the world political economy, the more cooperative will 
interstate relations be. 
 
South Africa’s claim to the status of regional hegemony in Southern Africa, although not 
officially pronounced, is not uncontested, especially by countries such as Zimbabwe, which 
had previously enjoyed a status of a regional hegemon before South Africa was re-integrated 
into SADC. It should be noted that while regional powers can give coherence to regional 
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security, they also have the potential to increase the conflict level if their legitimacy is not 
accepted or their claims for hegemony is disputed (Ayoob; 1995:59). Gilpin (1987) argues 
that: hegemony or leadership is based on a general belief in its legitimacy at the same time 
that it is constrained by the need to maintain it; other states accept the rule of the hegemon 
because of its prestige and status in the International political system. This study has found 
that in the case of Southern Africa there is a lack of hegemon acceptance by any state, which 
is why a need exists for a capable state in the region to assume the role of leadership.  
 
A considerable degree of ideological consensus, or what the Marxist scholar Antonio 
Gramsci would call ‘ideological hegemony’, is required if the hegemon is to have the 
necessary support of other powerful states (Keohane; 1984a:44-45). Antonio Gramsci (1891-
1937), is an Italian Marxist who introduced the concept of hegemony in IR generally and IPE 
particularly (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008). Gramsci analysed relations between states from 
a Machiavellian perspectives, in that there is a relationship of consent and coercion that 
occurs amongst states (Brown, 2005). According to Gramsci, states were being exploited by 
others because smaller states (in military capability) feared the coercive forces of the big 
states (Brown, 2005), the United States or China in current state affairs.  
 
Gramsci believed that it was hegemony that led states to adopt certain doctrines (socialism or 
capitalism) and this ends up becoming the norm, especially for smaller states as they have no 
militaristic power to protect their doctrine if it was against the Hegemonic Power’s doctrine 
(Brown, 2005). Gramscians believed in the economic analysis of Classical Marxism but 
expanded that the backing force was certainly coercion (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008). 
Gramsci’s hegemony is rooted in a process of moral and intellectual leadership through 
which domination or subordinate classes of post 1870s industrial states consent to their own 
domination by the ruling classes, as opposed to being forced or coerced. If other states begin 
to regard the actions of the hegemon as self-serving and contrary to their own political and 
economic interests, the hegemonic system will be greatly weakened. It will also deteriorate if 
the citizenry of the hegemonic power believes that other states are dishonest, or if the cost of 
leadership begins to exceed the perceived benefits. In such situations, powerful groups 
become less and less willing to subordinate their interests to the continuation of the systems. 
For Gramsci hegemony is a form of control exercised primarily through a society’s 
superstructure. Gramsci sets out two categories of what he believes to be super structure; the 
state and civil society (William, 1977). 
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The basic theory of hegemonic stability has been modified since the writings of these 
scholars; the refined version however does not assert an automatic link between power and 
leadership. Hegemony is now defined as a situation in which ‘one state is powerful enough to 
maintain the essential rules governing interstates relations and willing to do so’ (Keohane; 
1996:287). This modification of the theory declares that states with preponderant resources 
will be hegemonic except when they decide not to commit the necessary effort to the task of 
leadership, yet it does not tell us what will determine the latter decision. For the purposes of 
this thesis only the mainstream version of the theory of hegemonic stability will be 
considered because the refined version lacks a-predictive power. 
 
2.3.3 The Case Study 
South Africa’s economic liberation has increased dramatically after 1990, and the role of 
international markets and linkages has played an important part in its growth and structural 
transition (Allen; 2006:92). South Africa’s re-integration into the world economy accelerated 
following the democratic transition in 1994. Accession to the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO), negotiation of a free trade agreement with the European Union (EU), and discussions 
over a SADC free trade area collectively mark the growing contribution of trade to the 
prospects and prosperity of South Africa’s economic dominance and the region’s economy 
(Allen; 2006:92). McGowan and Ahwireng-Obeng (1998) argue that South Africa’s role in 
the region should be seen as either a hegemon or pivot depending on one’s disposition. South 
African foreign policy makers point out consistently that the duality and ambiguity eminent 
in the country’s foreign policy is due to the level of analyses one uses as a point of departure. 
South Africa in the global political arena is seen as a middle power, an emerging power in the 
context of the Global South (see IBSA forums) and as a regional power in Southern Africa 
(Nathan; 2005:361-372). Rob Davies in 1994 argued that South African foreign policy will 
be defined as either, seeing SADC as an integration under South African hegemony, or a non-
hegemony and through a regional cooperation model (Habib, 2003). Adam Habib (2003) 
argues that the problem with the previous assertions is that, there is an assumption that the 
process of partnership and hegemony are mutually exclusive models. Habib further argues 
that  
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“Any careful study of hegemonic behaviour, in both global and regional contexts would 
demonstrate that partnership is as much a modality of engagement for hegemony’s as is in other 
more aggressive interventions” (Habib; 2003:2). 
 
Habib thus argues that the debate pertaining South Africa should rather be framed in terms of 
hegemony or pivot, in which he reaches the conclusion that hegemony entails agency while 
pivot is more of a description. For purposes of this study the conclusions reached by Adam 
Habib based mainly on his analysis that hegemony entails agency will be adopted. The logic 
that dictates such a stance is informed by the notion that  
 
“Instability in this region, and as a result development, and democracy, will only truly be 
addressed, when a regional hegemon is prepared to underwrite these objectives. And so long 
as that does not happen, our national economic goals will remain compromised” (Habib; 
2003:3). 
 
Habib’s quotation suggests that Southern Africa currently does not have a regional hegemon 
as no country has fulfilled the criterion of leadership. John Daniel, Jessica Lutchman and 
Sanusha Naidu expand on this and maintain that South Africa in general has behaved in a 
non-hegemonic way in Southern Africa (Daniel, Lutchman & Naidu, 2004). They argue that 
South Africa’s involvement in the region has mainly been defined by corporate expansion. 
Daniel (et al., 2004) argues that because of its corporate expansion in Africa, South Africa as 
a state has been met with skeptism. Matu Wamae, (Quoted in Daniel et al., 2004:347) warned 
that the South African corporate invasion had to be stopped before it was too late:  
 
If we continue doing business with South Africa we’ll end up owning nothing in Kenya ... They 
bull-doze their way around. It seems like they still have the old attitudes of the old South Africa 
 
Roger Pardoe of Absa Bank stated that, “Absa was not investing in Africa for altruism. We’re 
investing in Africa to make some money” (quoted in Daniel et al., 2004:348). Daniel (et al., 
2004) argues that such a statement raises crucial questions about the South African state’s 
own engagement with Africa and whether the behaviour of corporate South Africa can be 
separated from that of South Africa’s political elites. 
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This study argues that South Africa has fulfilled the first two criterion economic and military 
dominance but has not fulfilled its role of leadership regionally. A background picture of 
what is happening in Southern Africa sheds light on this discussion. In Southern Africa, 
Angola experienced its own civil war, financed, perpetuated and inspired by diamonds and 
oil. The government and the rebels were trading valuable resources so that they could support 
their war efforts (Shah, 2008). The twenty-seven year brutal civil war in Angola between 
National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) rebels and the People’s 
Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) government in Luanda generated severe 
regional insecurity and threats of military interventionism by the governments of several 
countries in Southern, Central, and Eastern Africa (Orogun, 2002). The Angolan civil war 
had a depressing effect on regional development due to its sheer size of natural resources and 
the spillover effect of domestic turmoil in the region. 
 
While Zimbabwe is not experiencing a civil war, it is not at peace either. It is going through 
an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the contemporary world, which started with the farm 
invasions in 2000. South Africa at the time deployed the strategy of quiet diplomacy and the 
rest of the Southern African region specifically the regional body SADC did not criticize 
Zimbabwe. Almost twelve years since the start of the Zimbabwean crisis, the whole Southern 
Africa has been drawn into the crisis. This had divided Southern African countries with some 
states such as Botswana and Zambia stating that the current president should have stepped 
down while other countries such as South Africa and the DRC believed that there should 
have been a power sharing agreement in Zimbabwe. The outcome however is that a power 
sharing agreement in Zimbabwe has been reached, but its implications regionally mean that a 
divided SADC remains without an outright leader. South Africa’s policy of quiet diplomacy 
towards Mugabe has been severely criticised by the international community and within 
South Africa alike for lacking leadership skills.  
 
In Central Africa, the whole region felt the ripple effects that resulted from the civil war in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The country experienced what has been dubbed, 
‘Africa’s first world war’ or ‘The Great War of Africa’ (Porteous, 2004). This is because it 
involved nine countries which are; Zimbabwe, Namibia, Angola, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, 
Sudan, Chad and Libya (Porteous, 2004). The DRC borders the Central African Republic and 
Sudan on the North; Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi on the East; Zambia and Angola on the 
South; the Republic of the Congo on the West; and is separated from Tanzania by Lake 
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Tanganyika on the East. The DRC civil war has been the longest and bloodiest war since the 
Second World War. It broke out in the DRC when Uganda and Rwanda sent troops to back 
rebels that wanted to topple the then President Laurent Kabila. The latter sought help from 
Namibia, Zimbabwe and Angola and this had consequences on the socio-economic situations 
in these countries. The crisis of DRC is a good illustration of a lack of leadership and 
common values in the region. There were conflicting perceptions between the 1998 and 1999 
SADC summits regarding the functionality of the SADC organ OPDSC, specifically when 
and how it should intervene in conflict. While Pretoria contended that the organ had been 
suspended, Harare maintained that the Organ on Politics, Defence and Security, now the 
OPDSC, was alive and kicking since it continued to execute its mandate through SADC’s 
Inter-state Security and Defence Committee. Conflicting strategies over SADC’s involvement 
in DRC conflict further aggravated the internal crisis within the DRC and the SADC Organ. 
South Africa and some SADC member States (including Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and 
Mozambique) preferred preventive diplomacy and negotiated settlement of the conflict, while 
Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia opted for military intervention into the DRC in 1998 in 
support of Laurent Kabila’s government (Schoeman; 2000:117). Angola and Zimbabwe used 
the umbrella of SADC (Organ for Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation) to intervene in 
Democratic Republic of Congo respectively in 1997 and 1998.This successful military 
engagements in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997 and in the DRC in 1997-98, strengthened the 
feeling among the ruling elite in Angolathat the country had acquired the status of a regional 
power. This was recognised by French- whose interests in Congo-Brazzaville had been 
preserved- and by the Americans-who, after a formal condemnation of Angolan interference 
in the region, changed their point of view and henceforth considered Angola to be a decisive 
element in the Great Lakes conflict (Conchiglia; 2007:247). 
 
Despite the attempts by South Africa to re-examine the validity of this intervention, 
Zimbwean officials took the view that SADC, like its predecessor SADCC, was largely 
informal grouping of senior officials cheered by troika of heads of states that operate 
alongside. The Zimbabwean intervention transformed the attitude of the South African 
government towards Zimbabwe. Alden and le Pere (2003:47-48) note that this shift was 
motivated on the one hand by the recognition that the military intervention made in the name 
of SADC jeopardised the organisation; on the other hand, it was a direct challenge to South 
African aspiration to regional  leadership. With SADC split into two poles -Zimbabwe, 
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Angola and Namibia versus South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique- Pretoria’s aspirations 
for regional development and its own role as a continental leader were called into question. 
Leadership on the part of the regional hegemon could have provided feasible solutions and 
proposition tailored towards the ending of such conflicts. A counter argument towards the 
leadership proposition would however probe the actions of the regional organization in 
dealing with such a wide spread conflict (metaphorically). SADC it can be argued has an 
organ dealing with regional security OPDSC. The protocol on Politics, Defence and Security 
cooperation was adopted in 2001, formalising the organ dealing with regional peace and 
security. Article 2 sets out the objectives of the SADC Organ, which include the promotion of 
political collaboration among states, the search for common foreign policy approaches, and 
for appropriate mutual security and defence arrangements. Article 2 also highlights the 
importance of the “protection of people and development”. The creation of SADC is the 
formal expression of the shared interests of its member’s countries. However the intervention 
of South Africa and Botswana in Lesotho under the banner of SADC in September 1998 is 
not a reflection of shared interest (Schoeman; 2007:94). The conflicting interests of Angola, 
Zimbabwe and South Africa in DRC crisis is less the expression of partnership than a rivalry. 
Nonetheless the partnership between South Africa and Botswana in order to intervene in 
Lesotho or to opt for a diplomatic intervention in DRC present the features of leadership 
between the two countries. Sidiropoulos (2007:5) notes that SADC has battled to put its 
ideals of shared cooperation into practice, it has not played a leading role in resolving some 
of the difficult political conflicts in the region most notably in Zimbabwe. According to her, 
South Africa is also unwilling to stick its head above the proverbial parapet in this regard, 
because of its concerns about being left out in the cold by fellow African leaders.  
 
Despite its economic domination in the region, South Africa does not enjoy political 
domination in Southern Africa. South Africa’s engagement with other regional members 
seems to be largely defined by its economic interaction. In effect the interests of South 
African companies drives its political engagement within SADC, its involvement in the DRC 
and the mining industries in Angola, reflects the will of South African companies to control 
the raw materials of the region (Conchiglia, 2007). The heterogeneity of South Africa as a 
state and its companies reveals the dialectic between the market and the sovereignty (Allen; 
2006:185). Until now South Africa is more a convener of state and market relations within 
SADC than it is a leader. Its ability to fulfill the role of hegemon in the region depends on the 
influence it can have on capital, especially on South African private capital. Thus speaking 
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about South Africa as a regional hegemon is confusing its economic role in the region with 
the dynamic of regional politics. This study analyzed the impact of South African leadership 
in the region and reached the conclusion that the lack of control of the state on capital 
undermines the ideological leadership in the region. A recognition that the ideational 
component of hegemony, soft power, is still limited in its reach and acceptance is also 
crucial. The propensity in Southern Africa to associate liberal perceptions which President 
Thabo Mbeki has been an advocate of across the continent with the West has rendered South 
Africa susceptible to ‘accusations of being un-African and pro-Western’. 
 
The ultimate aim of this study and specifically the adoption of the new regionalism approach 
is to achieve positive peace as outlined by Galtung (1969). Newman (2007) argues that 
development is a tool for building peace and this study argues that the SDIs apparent in 
Southern Africa have the developmental potential to create a sustainable peace in the 
region.The main pallet of public goods that this study focuses on is peace achieved through 
socio-economic development and as such is believed to guarantee regional security. The 
following section will outline peace building generally and state which form of building 
peace this study has adopted 
 
2.3.4 Peace building 
Theory and concepts by their very nature do not emerge from vacuums. They gain legitimacy 
by echoing the dominant ideological practices of the day and are said to be better able to 
account for existing reality. The Cold War environment has given rise to security literature 
that is fundamentally concerned with notions of human security development and peace 
building. The literature of Conflict and Peace Studies has expanded from the 1990s onwards 
as the end of the Cold War witnessed a wave of peace building interventions that focused 
attention on causes and processes of conflict. As the study of conflict moved beyond its focus 
on Cold War game theory and state-centric strategy, Galtung’s (1964) discipline of Peace 
studies cemented its position in the social sciences as the hub moving the debate of the study 
of conflict and peace towards its new developmental path. The discipline moved beyond the 
strategic aspect of war, challenging state-centrism and also looking at the inherent 
contradictions and rationalities of conflict at the sub-national, transnational and global levels. 
 
The paper by Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005) Introduction to Conflict 
Resolution: Concepts and Definitions is an up-to-date portfolio of peace building’s ongoing 
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methodological debates, showing how it still attempts to deal with what Galtung (1969:183) 
observed as the overlap between development and peace building. While discussing 
illustrative graphics and tables from secondary sources, Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall 
(2005), argue that there are contemporary tensions in peace building approaches such as: 
short-term vs. long-term; one-dimensional vs. comprehensive; and prescriptive vs. elicit. 
They send across the point that, in order to achieve “positive peace” (Galtung; 1969:170), 
peace building should focus on the long-term, be comprehensive and adopt elicit methods 
relying on processes instead of outcomes. The prescriptive strength of the article should be 
praised although some criticism can be held concerning its high levels of abstraction. 
Nevertheless, its concluding analysis on the most pressing challenges for local empowerment 
leaves readers with substantial new insight in the workings of peace building. Structural 
global forces such as regional powerhouses, strong external groups suppressing the agency of 
local agents and dependence on the determinations of powerful donors (Ramsbotham et al., 
2005:229) are listed as the main fragmenting forces of local groups. Ramsbotham et al’s 
argument finds credence and goes hand-in-hand with calls for a review of the levels of 
policy-making in peace building also present in texts such as Daley’s (2006) and Addison’s 
(2005). This collection of literature, of which Ramsbotham’s et al., article is a subscriber, 
frequently starts by distinguishing (explicitly or implicitly) the different levels of analysis in 
the peace building context, moving from there to analyze power imbalances between actors 
within and across the levels, as well as issues of efficiency and sustainability. 
 
The conclusion on peace building literature is that peace and development are intrinsically 
linked, one is the means and the other is the ends. Overall, it is currently an accepted fact that 
peace building is central to development, while development is a pre-condition for peace 
(Mutisi & Maregere; 2006:16). The nexus of peace building and development make it 
obvious that any linear transition from insecurity to peace is difficult to maintain, but it also 
shows how development has been entrusted with the task of controlling and pacifying target 
populations, as well as being a bridgehead for positive peace. In the absence of an agreed 
upon definition, ‘peace is often defined negatively as the absence of war and physical 
violence’. In “Violence, Peace and Peace Research”, Galtung (1969) explains his highly 
acknowledged divide of the definition of peace, namely into positive and negative peace. For 
the purpose of this analysis, the significance of Galtung’s definition lies in its move away 
from a ‘negative’ definition of peace as an absence or cessation of direct violence, to a 
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‘positive’ definition of peace which takes into account both direct violence, and structural and 
cultural forms of violence. 
 
2.3.4.1 Peace 
Hamburg and Holl (2000) argue that security is traditionally a formal public good amongst 
nation states. They assert that peace or ‘just peace’ is a sustentative criterion for public good 
and is its penultimate form. Peace is seen as the result of preventing deadly violence which is 
argued to have universal externalities because it acts on potential sources of violence, and 
therefore potentially protects anyone form violence and death (Hamburg et al.; 2000:365). 
According to Kenneth Waltz in Man, the State and War (1959), the roots of conflict are found 
at three levels: the psychological level, the level of a society or political system and the level 
of the international system. Hamburg and Holl depict peace as the result of comprehensive 
and ongoing efforts to build social systems where differences can be settled peacefully 
(Hamburg et al.; 2002:365)  
 
“Human rights, the rule of law, basic needs, justice and environmental sustainability are all part of 
the equation, and the actors may involve public and private institutions or individuals. Hamburg 
and Holl present a bottom-up, multifaceted and multidisciplinary approach to world peace. 
Mendez focuses at greater length on the more strictly political and institutional aspects of peace, 
and the structures required at the level of the international system. Reviewing the historical record 
as well as the situation since the end of the Cold War, Mendez contrasts three models of 
international order: collective security, balance of power and hegemony. He argues that only 
collective security fully takes into account the public good nature of international peace, and that 
such a system is the most effective in the long run. International organizations such as the United 
Nations and regional bodies have key roles to play in such a system”. 
 
Lederach suggests an integrated and complex peace building process, with special emphasis 
on the continuing maintenance of peace. Lederach (1997:20) suggests that  
 
“peace building is more than post accord reconstruction. Here, peace building is understood as a 
comprehensive concept that encompasses, generates and sustains the full array of processes, 
approaches and stages needed to transform conflict toward more sustainable peaceful 
relationships. The term thus involves a wide range of activities and functions that both precede 
and follow formal peace accords. Metaphorically, peace is seen not merely as a stage in time or a 
condition. It is a dynamic social construct. Such a conceptualization requires a process of 
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building, involving investment and materials, architectural design and coordination of labour, 
laying of a foundation, and detailed finish work, as well as continuing maintenance”. 
 
Lederach (1997) and Galtung (1969) are central in the field of peace research. Lederach 
would link sustainability, which he defines as concern to “create a proactive process that is 
capable of regenerating itself over time - a spiral of peace and development instead of a spiral 
of violence and destruction” (1997:75) to the field of development studies, where Seidmann 
& Frederick (1992), Carley & Christie (1992) and Fisher (1993) are central figures. All of 
them, including Lederach, are focusing on the issue of sustainable development. 
 
In the absence of an agreed upon definition, ‘peace is often defined negatively as the absence 
of war and physical violence’ (Gawerc; 2006:435-438). The limitations inherent in such a 
narrow definition are many, ‘not least of which is that peace is often defined differently by 
different groups’(Gawerc; 2006:435), but also because such a definition, in focusing on 
physical violence, appears to ignore both the causes which led to violence in the first place 
and the basic reality of societies attempting to rebuild after a formal ‘peace’ has been made. 
Galtung (1969) does not disagree with the statement that ‘peace is the absence of violence’. 
Rather, he takes this statement and expands on the definitions of violence in order to come to 
a concept of peace which provides a basis for comprehensive and ‘concrete action’ as well as 
being ‘broad enough to include the most significant varieties’ of violence to be addressed 
(Galtung; 1969:167). In his seminal text ‘Violence, Peace, and Peace Research’, Galtung 
outlines a comprehensive typology of personal and structural violence and expands on its 
various meanings and manifestations (1969).  
 
The significance of Galtung’s definition lies in its move away from a ‘negative’ definition of 
peace as an absence or cessation of direct violence, to a ‘positive’ definition of peace which 
takes into account both direct violence, and structural and cultural forms of violence 
(Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Mjall 2005). By direct violence, Galtung means that ‘an 
actor…intends the consequences of violence’ (Galtung; 1969:167), and this violence is often 
physical. Structural violence, which is indirect, ‘comes from the social structure itself, 
between humans, between sets of humans (societies) and between sets of societies’ (Galtung; 
1969:167). Finally, cultural violence derives its legitimating power from the symbolic, found 
in ‘religion and ideology, in language and art, in science and law, in media and education’ 
(Galtung; 1969:167). These three forms of violence are mutually reinforcing, ‘much direct 
35 
 
violence can be traced back to vertical structural violence…and in the background is cultural 
violence legitimizing both the structural violence and direct violence to undo it and to 
maintain it’ In other words, ‘violence breeds violence’ (Galtung; 1969:167). 
 
As with the evolution of any academic subject, the field of peace studies has changed 
dramatically since its beginnings, and especially since the end of World War II. The 
definition of peace now entails much more than simply the “absence of violence,” and peace 
research is no longer seen as a separate entity from the discipline of international relations, 
but rather an intrinsic part of the subject. Implicit in the concept of peace is the contemporary 
notion of human security. Both peace and human security are broad concepts, but they are 
undoubtedly linked and one cannot achieve true peace without achieving the elements of 
human security. Peace is not simply the cessation of war, but rather it embodies an 
environment where individuals have basic rights and can live up to their potential, in an 
environment that fosters development. During the Cold War, the realist perception of security 
focused primarily on interstate conflicts and the balance of power between the United States 
and the Soviet Union. The interpretation of human security, however, encompasses a number 
of facets, including the rights and protection of individuals. With the current rise of civilian 
casualties as compared to combatant fatalities, and an increased understanding of structural 
violence, the idea of security on an individual-centric basis has gained prominence. Johan 
Galtung (1969), the father of modern peace research, speaks of many aspects of human 
security throughout his definitions of peace and peace-building.  
 
Theoretically, the social constructivist view of international relations supports the notion of 
human security and puts it in a framework of changing relationships that are susceptible to 
the social conditions around them.  In terms of real-life applications, conflict resolutions and 
peace agreements have little chance of long-term success without also ensuring human 
security. Galtung (1969) delineates a trilogy of actions necessary to achieve peace in a post-
conflict area, the success and failure of which can be seen through conflicts in Kosovo and 
Rwanda. Although there is ongoing academic debate on the value of labeling human 
securities, and on the definition of the word peace itself, there is unquestionably an expanding 
trend towards associating the two together. There cannot be peace without guaranteeing 
simple human securities. 
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2.3.4.2 Human Security and Peace  
The term “human security” first appeared in the United Nations Development Program’s 
(UNDP) 1994 Human Development Report and was framed in a way to emphasize 
individually-centered, sustainable development. Though there exists among academics some 
disagreement as to its exact definition, the UNDP outlines in its report seven key components 
of human security: economic, food, health, environmental, personal, community, and political 
security (Human Development Report; 1994:24-25) UNDP’s objective was to shift the focus 
from the security of nation-states and external aggressors to basic human rights (Human 
Development Report; 1994:24). Without these simple securities, individuals are not only 
more likely to turn to conflict, but are also more susceptible to being recruited for wars they 
may not ordinarily become involved in. It is also easier to manipulate ethnic, religious, or 
cultural issues if a population is missing multiple elements of human security. 
 
Since 1994, human security has been employed by numerous scholars (Paris, 2006 and King 
& Murray, 2001) in the context of conflict and of international cooperation. Although it is a 
relatively new concept, the components of human rights, and as an extension human security, 
have been in conversation long before 1994. Many prominent peace scholars allude to most, 
if not all, of the seven aforementioned securities as imperative to maintaining peace and 
stability. In her work on peace-building, Elizabeth Porter (2003:35) writes that human 
security entails a global humanitarian responsibility for welfare; therefore individuals and 
communities need empowerment to realize their own human security. This stresses the need 
to involve marginalized groups in peacemaking processes in order to make peace sustainable 
and to ensure that human security needs are being met.  
 
There are two disciplines of thought on human security, both of which are crucial to the 
concept, although the latter highlights the importance of maintaining security for non-
combatants during war and is more useful in terms of realizing peace. The aforementioned 
UNDP version of human security emphasizes human rights and development, while the other 
notion is centred on preventing the persecution of civilians during conflict, upholding rules of 
war, and limiting conflict-related damage (Newman; 2007:6). Peace researchers more 
frequently incorporate the secondary, conflict-related definition in their work. Galtung, for 
instance, continually builds upon the need for “positive peace”(Galtung; 1969:32). He 
underscores the importance of the contemporary transition from militaristic state security to 
that of human security, (Porter; 2003:35) and has supported this notion through past work as 
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well. In his 1969 article Violence, Peace, and Peace Research, Galtung dissects “violence” 
into multiple components that correlate to the various levels of human security, and sets out 
to show the absence of violence in a peaceful environment.  
 
To develop his view of positive peace, Galtung first describes violence as the difference 
between the potential and the actual, in reference to the effect of violence (both direct and 
indirect) on a person’s realization of his or her full potential (Galtung; 1969:168). Though 
Galtung acknowledges the difficulty in measuring an individual’s potential, the concept still 
has implications for all of the factors in human security. With violence and conflict disrupting 
lives, such securities are unattainable. Resources that are monopolized or diverted to warring 
parties, for example, may have otherwise been allocated to civilians or other individuals 
(Galtung; 1969:169). The economic repercussions are obvious. Conflict disrupts trade and 
livelihoods, putting affected civilians in a disadvantaged state. If a father or mother cannot 
work or provide for their families, there is clearly unused potential. If social infrastructure is 
threatened, education can be affected as well, leaving children’s development stalled and 
inhibiting the productivity of a generation of people. These can culminate into a situation that 
is vulnerable to even more violence and conflict. Further, Galtung organizes types of violence 
into that which affects the body, and that which affects the soul, or, rather, physical versus 
psychological violence (Galtung; 1969:169). This thought, notably the psychological aspect, 
contributes to both health and personal security issues. The consequences of physical 
violence are obvious, but wartime tactics such as sexual violence can have devastating 
psychological effects on its victims as well. Galtung discusses the threat of violence, as in the 
prospect for nuclear war or other attacks. There is no actual destruction, but this too can 
inflict psychological harm (Galtung; 1969:170). In the case of the Cold War, the balance of 
power act had just such an effect.  
 
Edward Newman of the United Nations University writes that “there is a greater 
understanding that human security deprivation – such as socioeconomic deprivation and 
exclusion, egregious abuses of human rights, and widespread epidemiological threats such as 
AIDS - has a direct impact upon peace and stability within and between states”(Newman; 
2007:241). This study bases its notion of peace on Galtung’s positive peace and adopts the 
expansion by Newman in diagnosing the insecurity and lack of peace in Southern Africa. The 
SDIs this study argues, have the potential to decrease such insecurities and human 
deprivation leading to a peace were Southern Africa has decreased levels of AIDS related 
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problem, and wider socio-economic inclusion of the communities in the region. Galtung’s 
discussion of violence and peace advances this point. His fourth distinction of violence 
questions whether an individual needs to be present to act, i.e., commits direct violence 
(Galtung; 1969:170). He concludes that there does not necessarily need to be a person 
perpetrating a direct physical assault, and that structural violence can just as easily limit a 
person’s security. Galtung uses the term “social injustice” synonymously with this thought, 
implying the lack of human security (Galtung; 1969:171). Lastly, Galtung draws on the 
differences between manifest and latent violence to show that although latent violence may 
not be palpable, it is no less dangerous in decreasing an individual’s potential. He concludes 
that social action and other methods can combat both personal violence and achieve social 
justice. In providing these classifications of violence and peace, Galtung is calling attention 
to the multiple layers involved in conflict-ridden societies. Both expressions are complicated 
and have complicated implications. Most importantly, however, is that humans need certain 
basic securities to live in peace, and that even in the absence of full-out war, structural and 
indirect violence can threaten stability. 
 
2.4 Conclusion of theoretical framework 
This chapter has focused on outlining the importance of analyzing on different levels to 
understand regionalism in order to have informed decision about development and region 
building. An important part of regionalism is to focus on the micro level and how it interacts 
with global forces through integration and development. The New Regionalism Approach 
(NRA) proposed by Bøås et al. (2005), Hentz (2003), and Taylor (2005) can be seen an 
attempt to use a multilevel geographical analysis to capture the interconnectedness of 
processes that take place on different geographical scales and their relation to region building. 
As the name indicates, the NRA focuses primarily on the region as a referent, but it also takes 
the individual seriously and considers issues such as access to water as central to security 
studies. Hentz (2003) and Taylor (2005) both emphasize that part of NRA’s project is to 
capture the linkage between the global and local. In the words of Hentz (2003:12) the region 
is a “prism through which local and global forces interact.” This knowledge can be used to 
organize and tailor development in regional spaces. Specifically for this study the interaction 
of local communities around the Spatial Development Initiatives and global forces in terms of 
production and capital become important for sustainable development in the region. Regional 
hegemony is crucial at this fragile stage as it has the resources and legitimacy to facilitate 
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such transitions and maintain a peaceful coexistence over the utility of newly found 
resources.  
 
The methodological systems mentioned above is adopted and utilized by the New 
Regionalism Approach in analyzing regional development. Such a position is informed by the 
assumption by NRA scholars that regionalism should be informed by the socio-political 
economy of a given region, be they formal or informal. The most important assertion in this 
regard is the one advanced by Hettne (1993) when he states that the new regionalism 
symbolizes the return of the political. The starting point for New Regionalism is that regions 
have become major players in the current world order over the last couple of decades (Bøås et 
al. 2005a and b; Hentz 2003). New Regionalism is preoccupied with understanding how and 
why this has happened, and points to five factors (Bøås et al. 2005a). First, the end of the 
bipolar world of the Cold War has created new actors and referents on the world scene, 
regions being among the most important of these.  Second, globalization has created uneven 
opportunities and impacts. The importance of the traditional nation-state is decreasing, in 
particular in the developing world where several states are best described as ‘failing’. An 
understanding of this requires an understanding of the interaction between local and global 
forces. Third, the state is not the only unit of analysis; formal and informal regional projects 
are also seen as defence strategies to global forces. Regional organizations such the European 
Union or Mercosur are seen as examples of this. Fourth, regionalization is not an inevitable 
outcome of these processes, and regional projects may fail or loose importance. 
 
The point of this chapter generally and of this study particularly is not to wish away the state 
under the NRA. Rather the point is to shift focus and ask what role will the state play, 
specifically the Westphalia system, in the reconstruction of a new world order. Hettne 
(2003:13) quotes Harpviken who claims that “While non-state actors may very well be 
playing an increasingly central role, they still do so very much within the frameworks 
represented by states..”. Such understanding is fundamental for the maintenance of a security 
community and the move by regional bodies to see peace and insecurity as an individual 
centered notion and not just limit it to inter-state conflicts. This chapter has moved to discuss, 
in the second section, the concept of hegemony which remains the independent variable that 
the study argues has the potential to achieve peace in Southern Africa. Sustainable peace is 
hard to achieve and the creation of security communities becomes fundamental for the 
maintenance of a lasting peace (NEPAD, 2005). The study has adapted the definition of 
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hegemony as one that entails leadership and agency beyond the dominance and 
preponderance of power that it has. The study acknowledges that the dimensions of ‘public 
goods’ that a hegemon should facilitate are: security; peaceful political transition; socio-
economic development; Human rights, justice and reconciliation and the coordination, 
management and mobilization of resources (NEPAD, 2005). 
 
South Africa has a role to play in the region, much like France and Germany after the Second 
World War, if sustainable peace is to be achieved. Identity, culture and development are 
essential public goods that regional actors can identify with and that South Africa can provide 
through leadership and agency in the development of Southern Africa. The main pallet of 
public goods that this study focuses on is peace achieved through socio-economic 
development and as such is believed to guarantee regional security. This study has not 
ordered or created a hierarchy of importance in terms of peace, security and socio economic 
development, as that is beyond the scope of this. This chapter has concluded by outlining the 
different dimensions of peace relevant to this study. In linking the theoretical framework of 
new regionalism approach with the concept of peace this chapter has come to these findings. 
The study has adopted the concept of positive peace as a criterion to aim for. Galtungs’ 
(1969) argument of structural violence has been adopted as the indicator or notion that 
facilitated development by a regional hegemon seeks to eradicate. 
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Chapter Three 
South Africa’s role in Southern Africa 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Castells (2001) notes that the rise of the current world order over the last decades “coincided 
with the collapse of African economies, disintegration of many of its states, and breakdown 
of most of its societies” (Castells; 2001: 82). Writers such as Mearsheimer (2001) argue that 
as a response states sought to establish themselves as regional hegemonies for purposes of 
survival and security. South Africa in Southern Africa has over the years tried to establish 
itself as a regional hegemon in order to maintain security and peace. The objective of this 
chapter is to evaluate South Africa’s role in addressing the research question: What is South 
Africa’s role as a development partner in Southern Africa? An alternative/ more appropriate 
operational term for South Africa’s foreign policy however is that advanced by Krasner 
(1976) and Nathan (2004) who speaks of creating ‘security communities’. The concept of 
security communities will help frame the linkage between bottom up and top down 
approaches of the New Regionalism Approach as it offers a formal arrangement by nation 
states that are preceded by domestic micro level cooperation. 
 
‘Security’ has different meanings depending on the context. It refers variously to stability 
within and between states, the security of states and of people, and the military and non-
military dimensions of security (Krasner, 1976). A ‘security regime’ can be defined as a set 
of principles, rules, norms and decision-making procedures that constitute institutionalized 
co-operation and permits states to exercise restraint in the belief that other states will 
reciprocate (Krasner; 1976:173-94). Nathan (2004) argues that a security community is 
preceded by domestic stability. Domestic stability and security represent the bottom up micro 
regionalism of the NRA. Nathan states that “whatever the nature of interstate relations among 
a group of countries, a citizenry engulfed by internal violence cannot plausibly be said to 
inhabit a security community” (2004:5). In the southern African context, the concept of a 
‘common security regime’ reflects SADC’s view that member states are interdependent, 
regional security is consequently a collective enterprise, and ‘institutional arrangements are 
required to ensure political stability and mutual security as critical components of regional 
co-operation and integration’ (Nathan; 2006:606).  
 
42 
 
This chapter’s sub argument is that Southern African states require a rallying point from 
where they can integrate and mobilize their resources for their common good. The apparent 
neglect of the region by the international community underscores the need for a wealthier and 
more powerful state to lead and mobilize others toward the provision for their common 
security. South Africa’s economic and military might in the sub-region provides that point 
needed for regional integration and cooperation. The purpose of this chapter is to draw 
together the major arguments and findings of this analysis, which together provide a broad 
perspective on the changing role of development in the South African and SADC economy. 
The chapter will begin by outlining the case of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) in 2010. This will be followed by the macro analysis of the region in 
order to establish what are the current patterns of development and main focus of the SADC. 
The third section discusses the case of South Africa’s foreign policy and its role in Africa 
generally and Southern Africa specifically. In all three sections the case of human security 
will be discussed. This chapter is mainly compiled for descriptive purposes and serves as a 
precursor to the arguments advance by chapter four. As this chapter is compiled from 
research efforts already completed, its intent is not to break new analytic ground. It strives 
instead to weave together the different analytic strands embedded in the works of ‘hegemonic 
stability’ and ‘regionalism’ under the New Regionalism Approach. Its main focus is to 
identify South Africa’s current role in the region in order to add to the discussion of its 
potential role for peace through development. 
 
3.2 The case of SADC in 2010 
The debt crisis of the 1980s led to the increased role of the IMF in entrenching ‘structural 
adjustment programs’ (SAPs) in the economies of the SADC (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008).  
The role played by the IMF is crucial in explaining the SADC situation in the present day. 
The IMF’s ‘conditionalities’ for aid meant that the government (recipient) had to devalue 
their currency, reduce inflation, reduce government expenditure in social services and in the 
economy, privatise its property, liberalise trade and create a free-trade economy with no trade 
tariffs (Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008 and Stephan, Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006). 
Although the SADC region is usually regarded as one of the wealthier regions in Africa, the 
growth performance of the SADC countries remain nevertheless low compared to other 
emerging blocs such as Mercosur and South East Asia. In 1999, four countries achieved 
growth in excess of 4 percent, with Mozambique recording 7,3 percent, Botswana and 
Tanzania around 4, 5 percent and Malawi 4 percent. The high growth rates in Mozambique 
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can be attributed to the end of civil war in 1992. Mozambique’s growth, it should be noted, 
came from a low base which was highly skewed towards the south. The relative peace 
reached in 1992 facilitated the utilization of the rich farm lands in the country, as agriculture 
accounts for 25percent of all exports and employs 80percent of the workforce (Arnold; 
2001:64). By the end of the civil war and the formal abandoning of its Marxist culture, 
Mozambique embraced open markets and attracted a considerable amount of foreign 
investment (Arnold; 2001:65). In 2003 the interregional trade was estimated to be at 25 
perdcent and has remained generally low, with expectations of reaching 35 percent in 2009. 
(Naidu, Roberts & Alvarenga; 2009:24). Southern Africa recorded a compined growth rate of 
5,9 percent in real GDP in 2006 becoming the second best performer in Africa (Naidu, 
Roberts & Alvarenga; 2009:25). Generally a further acceleration of growth in most SADC 
countries is necessary to provide a driving force into unemployment and poverty in the 
region. According to the SADC Secretariat in 2000 the SADC region required an average 
growth rate of more than 6 percent over the next ten years to make any significant impact on 
poverty (TIPS, 2000:9-10). 
 
There were great expectations that the demise of apartheid and the Cold War would usher in a 
period of sustained stability and development. Yet over the subsequent decades the region 
remained wracked by high levels of conflict that included civil wars in Angola and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), state repression in Zimbabwe, high levels of violent 
crime in South Africa and violence in a number of other countries. A traditional security 
threat to the state in southern Africa, mainly conflict between states, has decreased but the 
issue of human security has become more apparent but remains unaddressed. Citizens of 
SADC lack security and peace as they are denied access to water, food, shelter, education and 
medication to name but a few by the nature of their respective states. Structural violence has 
meant that many of the basic essentials needed by the people of Southern Africa are vertically 
scarce and inaccessible. Insecurity in the past has led to many communities in Southern 
Africa to picking up arms in order to gain security through liberation movements. 
Consequently, in 2010 most societies in SADC have overcome racial and colonial 
domination but structural violence has meant that positive peace has not been achieved rather 
even more people find themselves living in some of the most unequal societies in the world.  
 
Social exclusion remains the most common attribute that people of the Southern African 
region share. As a multidimensional notion conceived to capture the various political, social 
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and economic processes of social disadvantage and human insecurity, the notion of social 
exclusion can be captured in a matrix that may be seen as encompassing a series of 
exclusions that may be economic in nature (exclusion from employment, means of 
production, land...), political (denial of security, representation, citizenship, rights...), or 
social (exclusion from education, health services, or housing...). Rural communities find 
themselves as the most vulnerable group in the matrix of social exclusion. Moreover, there 
are rural/urban, sex, class and race aspects of inequalities in Southern Africa, with poor black 
females in rural areas, for example, being most likely to be the most insecure (MDG report, 
2009). The burden of HIV/AIDS, access to education, access to health services and last but 
not least access to the labour market all add to the picture of Southern African communities. 
 
3.2.1 Background on the macro analysis of SADC 
In the Lusaka Declaration (1980), the Front Line States (Angola, Botswana, Mozambique, 
Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe) created the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) intended to provide a barricade against the apartheid system prevailing 
in South Africa. The Front Line States were an informal political alliance that had attempted 
to aggregate the power of its member states for the pursuit of specific foreign policy 
objectives in Southern Africa. Mainly facilitating decolonization, the isolation of South 
Africa and safeguarding their sovereignty (Mazrui & Gordan; 1980:183-87). The strategy of 
the apartheid regime regionally hinged on achieving all-round domination: economic, 
political and military and turning the states of Southern Africa into satellites of apartheid 
colonialism. In pursuit of this objective, economic enticement, persuasion, sabotage, direct 
military aggression and surrogate bandit movements were used interchangeably and in 
various combinations to persuade southern Africa into submission. The damages caused by 
destabilization were huge, the SADCC secretariat estimated that in 1980 and 1984 it costed 
member states between US$10 and US$30 billion, almost the annual gross domestic of the 
SADCC region through 1988 (Weisfelder; 1989:163). The shift of the South African state’s 
identity in the 1990s, from a white minority rule to a black majority rule impacted on its 
attitude toward the neighbourhood states. 
 
The discourse of South African foreign policy moved from region destabilization to regional 
integration. Consequently SADCC became SADC in 1992 and broadened its concerns to 
facilitating regional economic integration. The participation of South Africa in 1994 
enhanced the viability of the SADC as an economic community. The Southern African 
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Development Community is a seventeen year old collection of states that form a region of 
this name (Stephan, Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006). Post-apartheid South Africa joined 
in 1994 making it the most powerful and most successful of all the regional blocs in Africa 
(Baylis, Smith & Owens, 2008).It is the successor of a similar body of nine states:Zimbabwe, 
Botswana, Angola, Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, Tanzania Malawi andMozambique - they 
were known as the Southern African Development Co-operationConference (SADCC). The 
SADCC was formed to reduce its economic dependence on apartheid South Africa at the 
height of its sanctions (Stephan, Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006). The organization’s 
main aim was to oppose apartheid era South African economic and military hegemony in the 
region (Bauer & Taylor, 2005 and Sejanamane, 1994). Thus, the main goals of the political 
leaders who formed the SADCC were not developmental (Lee, 2002). 
 
One of the main features of the SADC is related to the sector coordination approach, 
practically applied: each member country is responsible for a particular coordination sector 
programs (Chauvin and Gaulier, 2002). It followed then that a new role was ascribed to South 
Africa, specifically that of regional leadership. South Africa’s inclusion in SADC however 
did not imply a de facto relational change in foreign policy or a different pattern of 
relationship within the region. In effect the historical path of South Africa in SADC tends to 
show that the interest of South Africa is shaped by its identity. Once considered as a 
European outpost, South Africa today tries to strengthen its link with Africa as a whole and 
with SADC in particular.  
 
South Africa’s former foreign minister, Dr Dlamini-Zuma however offered a credible 
explanation for South Africa’s foreign policy in the region: 
… our collective experiences as South Africans have placed us in a unique position to 
understand the challenges facing humanity … firstly, ours is a reality of two nations, one 
developed and wealthy, the other marginalised and poor … Hence we have committed our 
foreign policy to the eradication of poverty and underdevelopment and for the transformation 
of the continent and the global environment (DFA, 2003). 
Sixteen years after the first democratic election, South Africa however is still struggling to 
transform the structure inherited from the apartheid era. One is the human condition that has 
been and continues to be threatened by imbalances in the production and distribution of 
goods and services, with the majority of the population living in conditions of poverty, 
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despite the region being richly endowed with natural resources. The national interest of South 
Africa which has been designed by the successive ANC governments still dominate its 
regional relations and is highlighted by the link between its foreign policy and the domestic 
issues of inequality. South Africa understands that equity and development will not be 
achieved through the redistribution of wealth but by the creation of new forms of wealth. This 
can be observed by the move from the Redistribution and Development Program (RDP) by 
the South African government to the adoption of GEAR. Despite the independent attempts at 
economic integration in the region, the role of South Africa is critical for its development and 
stability. South Africa’s hegemonic status in terms of finance, production and technology 
place it in a strategic position to champion developmental integration. Development 
integration is advocated for by the new regionalism approach and is distinct because of its 
characteristic as being state led regionalism. 
 
3.2.1.2 Background on the role of Capital 
The protocol on SADC Free Trade Agreement (FTA) came into force in 25 January 1996 but 
its “rules of origin” remained the fundamental obstacle to its achievement de facto. de Lange 
(de Lange quoted in Lee; 2000:138) notes that ‘the most significant thing about the recently 
introduced SADC FTA is that is has been so insignificant’. The actual FTA was implemented 
and launched in August 2008.  South Africa represents 70 per cent of SADC’s GDP placing 
the country in an asymmetric position vis-à-vis the rest of SADC region (Naidu, Roberts & 
Alvarenga; 2009:24-25). This imbalance was almost 7:1 in 2003 and is expected to remain 
this way for at least the next five years (Hudson; 2007:131). This has resulted in the benefit 
of the regionalism practiced in SADC being largely to the benefit of private companies in 
South Africa. This is due to the significant lack of intra-regional trade, as well as the fact that 
trade in the region is skewed in South Africa’s favour (Stephan; 2006:300). South Africa is 
also running a substantial trade surplus with each of its regional trading partners. The trade 
imbalance has widened considerably since the 90s and is likely to continue regardless of 
whether the free trade area is established or not (Chauvin and Gaulier; 2002:10). In order to 
reach broad based development SADC needs to focus on bottom up approaches to 
development. Formal institutional structures such as FTA’s will only further exacerbate the 
inequality between South Africa and other regional members. Such one sided development 
currently serves to benefit state elites who are able to negotiate favourable terms at the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU) forums. On a domestic level positive peace will 
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remain a distant illusion as regional ownership and common values for integration are not 
met. 
 
Southern Africa’s disarticulated; fragmented and narrow productive base exhibits the internal 
weakness of the regional political economy. In almost all the countries that form part of the 
region the industrial sector has experienced slow growth and the agricultural sector has either 
stagnated or is generally in decline (Schoeman; 2007:108). In addition some countries of 
Southern Africa are still dependent on particular sectors, concentrating production on either a 
single mineral or agricultural export. This suggests that the regional economy lacks 
diversification for trade creation and regional cooperation. Moreover the current financial 
crisis has the potential to further exacerbate poverty and insecurity in Southern Africa. Its 
impact is huge in the Southern Africa mining sector and industry; many people have lost their 
jobs since 2008 due to the global financial crisis (Naidu, Roberts & Alvarenga; 2009:39). The 
latest Summit of the Heads of States of COMESA-SADC-EAC noted that the global financial 
crisis poses a serious threat to the growth of African economies particularly in terms of 
demand for African exports of goods and services, tourism, foreign direct investment and the 
achievement of MDGs (Lusaka Times, 2009). The regional aid package to help Zimbabwe’s 
reconstruction could be affected by the financial meltdown according to the SADC officials 
(Roelf, 2009). 
 
According to Robert Davies in (Habib, 2003) SADC has since 1992 privileged trade 
cooperation to the detriment of integration and economic development, and should reorient 
its priorities. South Africa’s link with Mozambique is critical, because this integration is 
being driven less by new institutions of cooperation such as SADC than re-launching of the 
traditional pattern of expansion. This entails an effort to ensure control of natural resources 
which are scare in South Africa through the consolidation of developmental corridors 
(Conchiglia; 2007:251). This study generally seeks to explore such developments and how 
they could contribute to peaceful development throughout the region of Southern Africa. This 
will however be discussed more in detail in chapter four as this chapter serves to paint a 
picture of the current status of the region and South Africa’s role in it. 
 
3.2.1.3 Background on the socio-economic front 
Southern Africa is poor by international standards. Most of its member states are found in the 
low income or lower-middle-income categories used by the World Bank and defined in terms 
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of gross national income per capita (World Bank report 2009). Southern Africa is one of the 
world’s most economically challenged regions, according to the article “a gap that keeps 
widening” (Bhorat, 2003). The author attributes three main factors to his statement; these are 
trade flows, technological change and cross border capital flows (Bhorat, 2003). Southern 
African countries have suffered in reaping the benefits of globalization, as they mostly have 
export-based economies. The extractor infrastructure set up in Southern Africa has 
disadvantaged them in terms of benefiting from comparative advantage in trade and 
globalization. Trade is centered and concentrated in one part or a few countries such as South 
Africa and Botswana, as they have developed infrastructure (Bhorat, 2003).  South Africa, 
Botswana, and Namibia, which have the highest average levels of development in Africa, 
also have the highest levels of inequality (Stedman, 1993). 
 
Inequality in Southern Africa is inherent due to its integration into the global capitalist 
economy. In 2006, South Africa had a reported income Gini coefficient of 0.58 (UNDP, 
2006). Its growth however was above 3.1 percent from 1994-2004 (Du Plessis & Smit; 
2007:670). By contrast, this statistic, which ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 1, with 1 
being perfect inequality, averages around 0.3 in Europe, and 0.5 in Latin America. The 
UNDP (2006) estimates for Botswana and Namibia are even higher, at 0.63 and 0.74, 
respectively. More recent estimates show that inequality has declined somewhat (Botswana 
Central Statistic Office, 2006) but remains quite high. Inequalities within countries are just as 
apparent as domestic inequality. The legacy of incorporation was coupled with the legacy of 
colonialism, imperialism and segregation in Southern Africa. They existed and formed a 
doctrine of unequal development that penetrated all social institution in the region, from the 
most basic unit, the family to the state. The economic legacy of colonial integration entailed 
the notion of unemployment and underemployment of the African peasants group, which led 
to the majorities’ inheritance of poverty. Structural violence is apparent in Southern Africa 
and only negative forms of peace amongst member states can be said to exist. 
 
3.2.1 A view on human security in SADC 
The primary objective of the SADC alliance is to promote economic growth and 
development, to alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and quality of life of the peoples of 
Southern Africa and support for the socially disadvantaged through regional integration. 
Despite the end of Cold War and apartheid, the military impulse keeps its tenacity in 
Southern Africa (Nieuwkerk; 2003:2). Without neglecting the existence of ‘traditional 
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security’ threats, the issues of human security should be the region’s main focus. Micro level 
and non-state social interactions are becoming more and more important in the international 
community and Southern Africa needs to adopt more pragmatic shift towards such. The ANC 
policy document on defence (1992) acknowledges this shift: 
 
Security should not be restricted to military, police and intelligence matters, but … political, 
economic, social and environmental dimensions …Underdevelopment, poverty, lack of 
democratic participation and abuse of human rights are regarded as grave threats to the 
security of people. 
 
Human security is defined in the 1994 UNDP Human Development report as: “safety from 
such chronic threats as hunger, disease, and repression: and protection from sudden and 
hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily lives, whether in homes, jobs or communities” 
(UNDP report; 14:24-25). Accordingly to the classification of chronic poverty report 2008-09 
with the data collected during 1970-2003; Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo, 
Madagascar, Mozambique, Uganda, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe are across-the-board 
Chronically Deprived countries. Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and South Africa are Partially 
Chronically Deprived countries (Mini Atlas, 2005). Mauritius is a partial consistent improver. 
According to the Mini Atlas of Human security (2005) Angola and Uganda are among the top 
countries experiencing the highest number of one sided-violence from 1989 to 2005. The 
highest number of reported death from political violence in 2005 within Africa was in 
Uganda. Zimbabwe is among the five states in the world with the greatest scores of Human 
Rights abuses. The type of regime varies from country to country in the region. The spread of 
democracy from South Africa to the others countries remains critical. SADC is the epicentre 
of HIV and AIDS epidemic. The region has about 4 per cent of the global population but has 
a share of about 32 per cent of the global numbers of people living with HIV and AIDS 
(Naidu, Roberts & Alvarenga; 2009:87). About 52 per cent of women living with HIV and 
AIDS reside in SADC member states. Slightly more than 20 per cent of all orphans are in the 
SADC region (SADC; 2007:5). 
 
These facts show that the economic integration of SADC and the leadership of South Africa 
have not found the right response to the multitude of human security challenges in the region. 
Regardless of these types of assertions, focus on human security, in terms of the current 
security architecture, SADC is still centred on traditional security threats. The organization 
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has two key instruments to manage threats to the region’s peace and security, the Organ for 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) and the Strategic Indicative Plan of the 
Organ (SIPO): the organ designed to track and take care of, conflicts between and within the 
member states; and the mutual defence pact, designed to allow a coordinated response to 
external military threats. The Spatial Development Initiatives that will be discussed in 
Chapter four offer a possible solution to the responses needed by South Africa and SADC in 
order to increase human security and attain positive peace. South Africa as the regional 
hegemon has the obligation to diversify regional production bases, for both its economic 
development and that of the region. The SDIs by South Africa are aimed to rehabilitate the 
primary infrastructure network along the development corridor, notably road, rail, port and 
border posts, with the participation of the private sector in order to have minimum impact on 
public expenditure (Soderbaum, 2006) 
 
3.2.2 Migration and Development in Southern Africa 
Southern Africa has been referred to as a region that is literally on the move (McDonald, 
2000). This mobility is as a result of numerous push factors which include; the end of 
apartheid in South Africa, the establishment of SADC, the violent land invasions in 
Zimbabwe, the DRC war, the ousting of Mr. Mbeki as the president of South Africa, the 
collapse of Zimbabwe’s socio-economic structure as well as other factors. These factors have 
led to an explosion of the numbers of people crossing borders in Southern Africa. Arguably, 
Southern African countries can be divided into migrant sending countries, which include-
Zimbabwe, Zambia, DRC, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho and Swaziland; receiving 
countries such as South Africa, Namibia and Botswana. Like anywhere else in Africa, the 
migrants send remittances to their home countries to fend for relatives and friends. In the 
receiving countries, migrants become a source of cheap labour for the host country and even 
contribute to the skilled personnel of the host country. The relevance of this in regional terms 
is the formation and development of informal networks. The argument here is that 
communities beyond the geometry of state sovereignty are finding solutions to pressing 
problems in transnational structures. According to a USAID study, there exists more informal 
trade between Malawi and its neighbours Zambia, Mozambique, and Tanzania, than formal 
trade (Macamo; 1999:xi). In fact, the only area where formal trade was larger than informal 
was Malawi’s exports to Mozambique. Total formal exports were only 69.3 percent of 
informal exports and imports were 30.4 percent. Consequently, the government of Malawi 
loses a significant amount of revenue as a result of informal trade. The migration and cross-
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border informal economic activities of the people of SADC, suggests that equitable and 
sustainable development can only be achieved on the basis of full economic and political 
participation of the poor. In addition, informal trade and social interactions, which takes place 
across borders in SADC, could also assist in deepening regional integration and a sense of a 
security community. This suggests that the cross-border activities of these informal actors 
lend new meaning to conception of a SADC region and what constitute a security 
community. 
 
The construction of a security community by South Africa needs to be based on 
understanding informal networks which are brought about by increasing cross-border 
contact.Informal networks often use historically embedded cultural and social ties that 
transcend state-centric notions of regions and regionalism in SADC. As such, they form a 
transnational community that lies beyond the narrow conception of formal regionalism by 
states. Hettne (2003) argues that such transnational notions of regionalism speak to the heart 
of the NRA which looks beyond the narrow conception of state-centered formal regionalism. 
 
3.3 Current Prospects of Regional Integration 
Southern Africa currently has the Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
of 2004 as its vehicle for socio-economic development. The purpose of the RISDP is to 
deepen regional integration in SADC, and to provide SADC states with a consistent and 
comprehensive programme of long-term economic and social policies (RISDP, 2004). The 
core objectives of the RISDP are to create a peaceful stable political and security 
environment through which the region will endeavour to realize its socio-economic 
objectives (SADC, 2010). The first priority for the RISDP is on regional integration, and the 
promotion of trade and economic liberalisation as a means of facilitating competitive and 
diversified industrial development through the achievement of a SADC Customs Union. The 
following statement from the SADC website signifies the intentions of RISDP to implement 
this process.  
“SADC has adopted milestones to facilitate the attainment of the SADC Free Trade Area 
(FTA) by 2008, the Customs Union (CU) by 2010, the Common Market (CM) by 2015, 
Monetary Union (MU) by 2016 and the Single Currency by 2018”(Naidu, Roberts & 
Alvarenga; 2009:44). 
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RISDP (2004) was first formulated in the March SADC summit in 2001 were the agenda was 
the restructuring of the SADC body (SADC Annual Report, 2004). As outlined in the 
Windhoek Declaration SADC has identified four sectoral co-operation and integration areas: 
Trade liberalization and development; infrastructure support for regional integration and 
poverty eradication; sustainable food security and human and social development (Windhoek 
Declaration; 2006:10). 
 
The RISDP also emphasizes the development of water and energy resources in Southern 
Africa. The need for focusing investment in the Southern African Power Pool (SAPP) has 
been identified to pre-empt future energy problems and to further develop water resources 
management, building on the Shared Water course Systems Protocol (Stephen, 2008). The 
SAPP came into being and moved towards implementation in December 1995 when the 
national utilities of nine SADC countries joined an Inter-Utility agreement. “It was the first 
formal international power pool established outside Europe or North America … and in terms 
of its constitution, only utilities, not individual power stations, are allowed to join” (Stephan; 
2008:69). SAPP has allowed for the emergence of the Southern African Grid 
 
“an ingenious and effective way of countering crippling shortages of electricity by moving power 
around the sub-continent. This has helped free electricity supply in the SAPP countries from the 
impact of drought and other natural disasters, particularly as the interconnections allow for the 
routing of power under almost all circumstances” (Stephan; 2008:70). 
 
The Southern African Region is characterized by a multiplicity of regional integration 
initiatives and institutions. There is a significant overlap in the membership of regional 
organizations as SADC also includes members of COMESA, EAC, ECCAS and SACU. 
 
3.4 Overview of South Africa’s role in the region 
After the first democratic elections in 1994 and the end of the Cold War, South Africa could 
freely establish diplomatic and economic contacts with other African states, as it was no 
longer isolated like the Apartheid regime. This was a defining change for South African 
foreign policy in general and especially its policy towards the African continent. South Africa 
had to position itself in the international community and in Africa (Pfister; 2000:1). As 
Nelson Mandela stated:  
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“South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies to this 
continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts. [...] 
We are inextricably part of southern Africa and our destiny is linked to that of a region, which 
is much more than a mere geographical concept.” (Pfister; 2000:6)  
 
The goal of common security remains part of the Department of International Relations and 
Cooperation’s (DIRCO) agenda. The relevance of South Africa’s national vision of building 
a united, non-racial, non-sexist and prosperous society, for the whole continent is also 
emphasized. The Strategic Plan outlines three pillars for engagement with Africa: The 
strengthening of Africa’s continental and regional institutions, the African Union (AU) and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC); support for the implementation of 
the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD); and strengthening of bilateral 
socio-economic relations through effective structures, dialogue and cooperation. The aims of 
South Africa’s foreign policy for Southern Africa “are therefore the resolution of conflict and 
the building of a framework within which socio-economic development can take place” 
(DFA; 2005:19). 
 
The 1990s were symbolized by a  unilateral and unsteady approach to crises in Southern 
Africa, which was not always successful and also led to criticism from other African 
countries, who would have preferred a sometimes more multilateral and cooperative approach 
to problems, such as civil wars and internal conflicts in e.g. Nigeria, Zambia, Angola and 
Lesotho (Kagwanja; 2006:162-164). This changed when Thabo Mbeki became South 
Africa’s president in 1999. He applied a far more multilateral approach, based on the concept 
of ‘African Renaissance’, which has its roots in Pan-Africanism, aiming to improve the 
image of Africa through the “regeneration and reintegration of Africa into the globalised 
world” (Kagwanja; 2006:169), and giving Africa a more active role in a process of self-
emancipation. It generally is a “holistic vision aimed at promoting peace, prosperity, 
democracy, sustainable development, progressive leadership and good governance.” 
(Kagwanja; 2006:169), South Africa definitely has the ambition to take the reins of 
continental leadership in Africa. Thabo Mbeki was the first chair of the African Union (AU) 
in 2002 and the South African foreign minister Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma was the first chair 
of the AU’s Peace and Security Council (PSC). South Africa furthermore hosted the 
secretariats of NEPAD, NEPAD’s African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the Pan-
African Parliament. South Africa is a regional power because of its economic strength, level 
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of industrialization and its military capacity. It also has a moral authority, because of its 
leadership’s struggle credentials and the successful transition to democracy in a multi-ethnic 
country (Kagwanja; 2006:159-160). 
 
Its economic dominance in Africa is impressive. During the 1990s and even up to 2005, 
South Africa was the single largest source of new foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa, 
although there is growing Western and Asian investment in Africa, after a phase of de-
investment in the nineties (Daniel et al.; 2004:347). South Africa’s investment is said to lead 
the growth of the private sector in Africa, by improving the economic growth, technology 
transfer, re-industrialisation, acquisition and re-vitalization of state-owned enterprises and 
thus formalizing the market (Daniel et al.; 2004:347). This leads to more price stability, 
creates job opportunities and good corporate practices and therefore attracts more foreign 
investment from other countries. The most of South Africa’s FDI goes to Southern Africa 
mainly to Mozambique, which amounted to nearly ZAR20 million in 2006, followed by the 
DRC, Nigeria and Namibia (Daniel et al 2007:347). The biggest South African projects are in 
the natural resource field, but there are South African companies active in all sectors of the 
economy. South African FDI therefore played a big role in contributing to the creation of 
growth rates around 8percent (Kagwanja; 2006:160). The main sectors of South African FDI 
in Southern Africa are telecommunications, mining, electricity, steel, oil, food, leisure and 
banking. The players with the biggest volume of FDI are MTN, Vodacom, Transnet, Eskom 
and AngloGold Ashanti, while Checkers, Game, Protea Hotels, Debonaires, Nandos, Steers, 
Woolworths and Standard Bank are the most common South African companies in Africa 
(Kagwanja, 2006 and Daniel, Lutchman & Comninos, 2007). 
 
After the end of Apartheid the percentage of total South African exports to Africa has grown 
from 4percent in 1991 to 16,7percent in 2002 (Daniel, Lutchman & Comninos; 2007:508-
516). But since then there has been stagnation, or even some decline, which is seen as result 
of the general level of poverty and therefore only a limited number of possible customers. 
South African imports from African countries on the other side, only accounted for 
4,9percent in 2005 42percent of these are oil and natural gases (Daniel, Lutchman 
&Comninos; 2007:508-516). South Africa also uses its economic power to protect its local 
industry through trade barriers and tariff concessions (Kagwanja; 2006:160). 
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Another pillar of South African relations with the region and continent is conflict resolution 
and peace-making. As South Africa played a big role in the foundation of the AU, the AU has 
a strong South African imprint. This can be seen in the establishment of an African Stand-by 
Force (ASF) that can also intervene in internal conflicts with the authorization of the PSC, 
while Libya mainly wanted it as protection against external threats. South Africa itself has 
been involved in several peacemaking processes, e.g. in Burundi, DRC, Cote d´Ivoir, 
Comoros, Somalia, Eritrea-Ethiopia. In 2006 over 3000 South African peacekeepers were 
deployed. South Africa has the economic and military potential to be an outright regional 
hegemon. South Africa as a regional hegemon has five distinct comparative advantages: 
geography, resource endowment, market size, active private sector and military power. First, 
it is a resource-rich country with natural resource rents accruing from relatively diversified 
natural endowments in both agriculture and mining. The second factor is the physical 
geography, the country is a coastal state strategically located on the southernmost part of the 
continent. Thirdly, South Africa is the largest economy in the region with a population of 
almost 48 million and important growing middle class (HDI, 2009). Fourth, the private sector 
is relatively well established and diversified compared with that of the rest of the SADC 
member countries. Finally South Africa is the first and most dominant military power in 
SADC (Strategypage, 2009). Although compared to other global middle-powers, it faces a 
variety of problems and crises at home, limiting its potential to put substantial economic and 
political resources into international projects. It should also be noted that South Africa’s 
developmental tools like NEPAD and its APRM still have to prove their effectiveness on 
promoting peace and democracy (Kagwanja; 2006:173-180). 
 
3.4.1 The Economy 
South African economic relations are characterized by a market based system of ownership 
of capital and the distribution of wealth and income. Domestic and regional development 
remains the key objectives outlined by the Growth Empowerment and Redistribution 
(GEAR) policy.The economic performance of South Africa has improved since its first 
democratic election, with an average real GDP growth rate of 4.5 percent between 2003 and 
2006, up from 3.25 percent during 1999-2002 and 5 percent in 2006, its highest since the end 
of apartheid (Kasekende et al, 2007:52). The African Economies Outlook (2007:488-490) 
shows an overview of the South African economic situation during the period 2006-2007. 
South Africa’s GDP accounts for approximately 80 percent of that of SADC and, as a result, 
South Africa has to be viewed as a regional hegemon, regardless of whether it is overtly 
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dominating the sub-region or not (African Economic Outlook; 2007:489). It should be noted 
that most of South Africa’s engagement with the region so far has been based on a top down 
approach. 
 
In May 2006, the turbulence of emerging financial markets affected South Africa, pushing 
the Rand to a depreciation of 20 percent. The mining sector in the same year contracted by 
3,4 percent after recording a lacklustre growth in 2005. In the third quarter of 2009 on the 
other hand the mining sector recorded a physical decline in the volume of production by 7,5 
percent compared to the previous months (Naidu, Robertsn& Alvarenga; 2009:30). In 
contrast the labor intensive construction sector showed 13,2 percent growth in the first 
quarters of 2006 and reported a 22 percent increase in employment.  
 
In addition South Africa national savings rate fell to a historical low of 13 per cent in first 
quarter of 2006 which was reflected in a dramatic widening of the current account deficit to 
6.1 percent of GDP, its highest level since 1994 (Annual Report, 2007). Prudent policies have 
resulted in a dramatic consolidation of South Africa’s fiscal position since 1996. Budget 
deficit have recently hovered in a range between 1,5 percent of GDP in 2004/05 and 0,4 per 
cent in 2006/07 while national government debt has been scaled back from 45,5 per cent of 
GDP in late 2001, to 34,8 percent in the second quarter of 2006 (Annual Report; 2009:129-
131). Real output growth in the South African economy remained weak in the second quarter 
of 2009. Having declined at annualised rates of 1,8 percent and 6,4 percent in the preceding 
two quarters, real GDP contracted at a rate of 3percent in the second quarter of 2009 (Annual 
Report; 2009:131). Production volumes continued to decline in all three major sectors of the 
economy. 
 
3.5 Human Development Index 
A focus on the state of human security in the country however provides a broader picture of 
reality. According to the human index report 2009, among the 108 developing countries, 
South Africa is ranked 29, 4 places behind Mauritius, Southern Africa’s highest performer 
which ranks 25th ( (Naidu, Robertson & Alvarenga; 2009:11). In addition, 26,6percent of the 
population are unemployed in the formal sector and 16 in the informal sector (Devey et 
al.;2006:2). The results of the third quarter from show that employment contracted by 0.7 
percent or 86 000 jobs between the second and the third quarter of 2010 (Lehohla; 2010:1). 
The unemployment rate in this period remained unchanged at 25.3 percent, but still 4.4 
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million people remain unemployed and the youth comprise 3.1 million (71 percent) of the 
total unemployed (Lehohla; 2010:1). The number of discouraged jobseekers went up by 4.9 
percent or 95 000 people (Lehohla; 2010:1). More than 2,5 percent of the population are 
undernourished, only 65 percent used improved sanitation (Devey et al.; 2006:2). According  
to  2009  estimates,  9,3  million consumer  units  were  receiving  sewerage  and  sanitation  
from  municipalities  in South Africa and 32,7% consumer units had access to free basic 
sewerage and sanitation (Stats SA, 2009). The life expectancy is 50,8, 47,5 per 100,000 
people (Matlosa; 2007:120-127). However public health expenditures which is 3,4 percent of 
the GDP remains the priority of the government rather than military expenditure which was 
1,5 percent of the GDP in 2005. According to this data the South African government does 
not fulfill the basic expectations of the majority of its population. The failure of the trickle 
down economic policies so central to the post-1996 GEAR era and the lack of coherent 
policy on the informal economy reflected in the lack of coherent programmatic approach to 
dealing with the development and support of this sector (Devey et al, 2006:2 and Bundlender 
et al, 2004:86). In addition the Gini index since 1994 is almost the same at 0,57, this fact 
acknowledges that the growth redistribution strategy of the ANC government is not accurate 
to reduce the inequalities prevalent in South Africa, at least in the short term. Therefore 
nothing is certain, in terms of regional security as South Africa, the most capable state to lead 
a hegemonic project in SADC, does not have domestic security. The outcomes of this 
situation lays in the leadership of the SADC member countries, specifically that of South 
Africa in ensuring that regional inequalities are eradicated through region wide development. 
 
Persson and Tabellini (1991) and Alesina and Perotti (1993) propose that inequality is 
harmful to growth because greater inequality leads to greater political instability and lower 
capital formation. The ultimate aim of economic growth must be the betterment of living 
conditions of the poor. Economic growth that does not lead to sharp and sustained reductions 
in poverty may create more problems than it solves. Poor economic conditions increase the 
risk of civil war occurring in Southern Africa (Fearon & Laitin, 2003). This study interprets 
these figures to support the theory that GDP per capita can act as a proxy variable for police, 
military and administrative capabilities, and thus when the GDP per capita is low, the 
capabilities of a government to control its country decreases, resulting in the increasing 
opportunity for rebels to group, initiate and contribute to a civil war (Buhaug & Gates, 2002 
and Collier & Hoeffler, 2002, 2004, 2009). Hence, it can be deemed that Southern Africa’s 
atypically poor economic performance will contribute to being a key factor in the 
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continuation of SADC’s high volume of civil wars occurring (DeRouen & Sobek, 2004). 
Such inequalities in income further highlight the need for regionally development and this 
study advocates that the SDIs offer the most feasible developmental path for countries in 
Sothern Africa. Therefore nothing is certain, in terms of regional security as South Africa, the 
most capable state to lead a hegemonic project in SADC, does not have domestic security. 
The outcomes of this situation lays in the leadership of the SADC member countries, 
specifically that of South Africa in ensuring that regional inequalities are eradicated through 
region wide development. 
 
3.5 Conclusion 
South Africa’s effort at mobilizing other countries of the region to come together and provide 
for their common security and to foster economic integration is aimed at addressing regional 
stability but it remains academically either misunderstood or not appreciated. There are some 
who fear that South Africa’s dominance in the affairs of the region is capable of undermining 
the sovereignty of weaker regional States (Landsberg, 2003). Some argue that on the 
contrary, South Africa’s dominance in the sub-region has been exercised cautiously and in a 
responsible manner for the interest of the entire region. This chapter has used these 
arguments and assertions to evaluate South Africa’s role in the region in an analytical manner 
and address the research question that asks what is South Africa’s role as a development 
partner in Southern Africa? Welssh & Butorin (1990:310) describe development as “the 
process of economic and social betterment resulting from increased production and more 
rational or equitable distribution of benefits from this activity”. The chapter has found that, 
stability and development in South Africa can be represented as a circle of interconnected 
factors where, poverty alleviation is linked with the continuous growth of the economy, and 
the continuous growth of the economy is linked with capital flow, which is linked with 
political stability and profit. Thus the stability and the development of South Africa depend 
on the market, more precisely on Foreign Direct Investments. Consequently South African 
domestic issues and FDI’s attraction appeared as the main factors which can determine its 
relationship with the other SADC member countries. This relationship has mainly been 
defined primarily in terms of market oriented objectives (market integration) and secondarily 
as solidarity or political motives or more prude as a tool to attain market dominance. There 
are three features in the development agenda of South Africa, the short term objective is the 
accumulation of capital, the medium objective is the reduction of poverty and the long term 
objective is the reduction of inequality. 
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This chapter moreover has given an overview of the status of Southern Africa. Some of its 
findings can be summarized as follows. Firstly one can argue that, the key problems 
identified with regard to regional governments are instability, bad governance and 
insufficient investments for development. Southern African regional governments are 
grappling with underdevelopment, and inability of being equal players in global economies 
due to their single market, export orientated structures. The benefits of South African 
development could be attributed to the fact that it enjoys trade surplus within the region to a 
larger extent, and has an infrastructural advantage. The long term development of regional 
governments however will require implementation of strong political reforms and the 
implementation of good governance practices, transparent governments, and rule of law. 
Such initiatives will require regional and continental bodies such as the SADC and the AU to 
build regional capacities among member states through NEPAD. South Africa is already 
playing a leading role in championing the NEPAD, which is the one of the blue prints 
initiatives for Africa’s socio-economic development. However the Southern Africa region has 
not managed to establish an effective institutional policy framework for sustainable 
development. The result of which is the international community’s reluctance to invest in the 
region as a result of poor governance and state of insecurity 
 
Secondly this chapter has concluded with the findings that NEPAD is the internationally 
agreed framework for the socio-economic development of the continent and RISDP is the 
vehicle for socio-economic development regionally. In 2010 a democratic South Africa has 
meant that its economy is inextricably connected to the Southern African region. Both 
establishments have in common the driving engine of South Africa in the economic sector, 
but South Africa has tended to lack initiative in the political front. South Africa, under the 
leadership of Thabo Mbeki, its former president, has declared itself a developmental state, but 
has been criticized by some scholars for not fully being a mirror of the Asian Tigers who 
were ‘true’ developmental states (Stephan, Power, Hervey & Steenkamp, 2006). South 
Africa’s role as an interventionist state nonetheless, has shaped policies of other SADC 
nations towards this direction, with a lot of shared major resources still at the hands of 
governments. A demonstration of South Africa’s new interventionalism has been South 
Africa’s involvement in the cross-border and state-owned reserves for water (mainly from 
Lesotho and Mozambique), electricity (mainly from South Africa’s Eskom) generation and 
distribution, energy (Congo and South Africa) and many other developmental resources in 
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the region (Heyn et al, 2008). These development initiatives are currently benefiting national 
markets and make profit for the nations that are at the forefront of the service. 
 
Thirdly, Security communities represent a top down synthesis with bottom up regionalism as 
it addresses the question of domestic and de facto regional security. The spatial development 
initiatives represent the common values and institutions that will drive voluntary regionalism 
in southern Africa. This study focuses on the goals outlined by the establishment of SADC 
and argues that through the interaction of non state (private) with state (public) actors can 
these goals be realized. Given the ominous global and regional socio-political developments 
of the past two decades, the southern African region and its multilateral institutions are in a 
state of flux and change (Nathan, 2006). SADC and located within it, SACU have to redefine 
their aims and purposes in order to meet the security index’s necessary for sustainable 
development (Nathan; 2006:605). This study argues that the current method of the SADC 
towards achieving its aims and objectives has not yielded substantial results. The adoption of 
RISDP by SADC signified a move for creating greater cooperation and effectiveness but 
RISDP has turned out to facilitate Free Trade institutional structures more than actually 
addressing the issue of broad-based regional development. Southern Africa needs a capable 
hegemonic state that can lead the project of regional integration as the NRA views integration 
as a necessary condition for attaining security, poverty alleviation and peace. 
 
Fourthly, the role of South Africa and SADC as a body, have been limited to state-centric 
forms of security and integration. They neglect NRA aspects of regionalism that incorporate 
non-state actors in order to have ownership over regional development projects. The purpose 
of this chapter has been to explore the nature of such an establishment SADC generally and 
South Africa’s role in it particularly. The study in general seeks to investigate the micro level 
of regional integration, as advocated by the NRA, as this remains neglected in Southern 
African regional discourse. South Africa makes for an interesting case given its historical 
contact with the region at large and mostly due to its sheer dominance in its overall power 
utilities in the region. South Africa’s economic power is evident when one looks at the role 
South African capital occupies regionally. South African investment and trade with African 
countries have increased dramatically since 1994. Africa is now South Africa’s fourth-largest 
export destination (Annual Report 2009:137). South African investments in Southern Africa 
alone totaled ZAR14,8 billion in 2001. Trade with the rest of Africa increased to ZAR108 
billion in 2007 with exports amounting to ZAR68 billion and imports to about ZAR40 billion 
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(Annual Report 2009:137). In the same year, South Africa’s trade in the SADC region totaled 
ZAR68 billion with exports reaching ZAR44 billion and imports ZAR24 billion (Annual 
Report 2009:137). South Africa accounts for nearly three-quarters of the aggregate gross 
national product (GNP) of SADC. The next largest contributors are Tanzania (4 per cent), 
Zimbabwe (3.8 per cent), Botswana (3.4 per cent) and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) (3.2 per cent) (Conchilglia, 2007:247-249). Senior SADC officials are frank in stating 
that ‘without stability, investment and development will not follow’ (Alden and le Pere 
2003:47-48). Consequently stability remains the primary goal in which political discourse, 
development in the economic sphere, the social sphere and growth will follow. 
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Chapter Four 
Spatial Development Initiatives 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Regional integration has become a fashionable idea among modern states. Independent 
nations have seen the fruits from cooperation in areas of trade, social spheres and security. 
Today, there is hardly any country on the African continent that has not shown interest in one 
of the existing regional cooperation schemes (Adetula; 2004:2). Despite the emergence of 
several regional organizations in Africa, whose objectives are to foster peace and security 
(See AU Constitutive Act, Article 3 (f); The Treaty of ECOWAS, Article 58; and SADC 
Declaration of Treaty; Article 5), conflict and insecurity has continued on the continent. 
According to Muggah and Batchelor (2002:10), of the 30 to 50 conflicts occurring each year 
between 1989 and 1995, more than 95 per cent took place in developing countries. 
Specifically, Muggah & Batchelor state that in Sub-Saharan Africa alone, more than 20 per 
cent of the continent’s population was directly impacted by civil wars during the 1990s. This 
therefore brings to question the efficiency and effectiveness of the regional groupings in 
fostering peace and security within the region. (Blaauw; 2006:1) states: 
 
“Since the end of the Cold War, the idea and organization of the concept ‘region’ has elicited 
renewed international attention. This resurgence in the study of international regionalism is 
characterized by the revival of old regional organizations, the formation of new ones and the 
deepening of existing regional arrangements. This renaissance in the study of regionalism is, 
however, not only limited to the study of regional bloc formation by states alone. Because of the 
increasing obviousness of transnational and non-state phenomena in the post-Cold War era, 
contemporary studies of regions and regionalism recognize the need to transcend purely state-
centric notions of regionalism. Phil Cerny argues that the study of regionalism should also be 
driven by politics: by ideology, by the actions, interactions and decisions of state actors, their 
private sector interlocutors and the wider public. This calls for recognition that the conception of 
regions and the practice regionalism are not only state-centric projects. The definition of regions 
and regionalism needs to recognize that other actors also participate in the construction of regions 
and the practice of regionalism” 
 
The new regionalism will in this section be identified and limited to the SDIs. They are 
argued throughout this study as the developmental path, as led by South Africa, that could 
lead to a peaceful coexistence among people of Southern Africa. The SDI’s are based on 
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three particular areas: transport, hydroelectricity and shared water resources. SADC 
Development initiatives are tailored at formally creating a regional security community in 
which further development could help in the eradication of inequality, poverty and meeting 
other MDG’s set out for 2015. 
 
Southern Africa makes for an interesting case given its conflictual history and its historic 
formation. Arguably Southern African states Botswana; Lesotho; Namibia and Swaziland 
(BLNS) were created and solidified around the insecurity of colonial destabilization. The 
state system in the region has been one built around the conception that production of means 
to support human life is centered on intensive labour and its mobility. The migrant system in 
Southern Africa created a pattern and culture of informal networks in the region. Southern 
Africa it can be argued is experiencing a re-emergence of micro-regionalism (Soderbuam, 
2006). The SDIs programmes are the most visible forms of this form of micro regionalism. 
Primarily all the major projects in the SDIs are based on a partnership between the public and 
private sectors. The SDIs programmes focus attention across the various national and 
regional spaces with the objective of ensuring that investments are swift and that synergies 
between the various types of investments are maximized (Soderbaum; 2006:162-3). The SDIs 
programmes seek to move away from the protected and isolated import substitution approach 
to economic development.  
 
This chapter will outline that development in the regional context invariably contain specific 
or implicit references to increased trade and economic integration. The chapter will argue that 
the Development Corridors apparent in Southern Africa have the promise to forge the most 
feasible cooperation amongst regional states. This will be followed by the argument that with 
a developmental perspective on regional integration, countries will, complement development 
strategies with regional industrial policy aimed at job creation, the diversification of their 
economic base, and the expanded integration of the region into the global economy. The third 
section will discuss the case of transfrontier parks in Southern Africa. Peace parks offer a 
unique form of regional cooperation were local communities stand to benefit the most from 
such an arrangement. Bringing the politics back into local spheres addresses one of the 
research problems pertaining to the relationship communities have with the material 
resources around them. Regionalization can either be done formally by states, or informally 
by non-state actors, The Peace Park initiatives offer a synergy of the two, depending on 
which stage of development on focuses on. As a result of peace parks, both the states and the 
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populations in Southern Africa would be dependent on cross-border flows of services, capital 
and trade (Bøås, 2003). This form of regionalization has also been emphasized by Bøås et al. 
(2005) who claim that the geography of the world has changed. One of the most fundamental 
changes is that different sovereignties are increasingly overlapping, and regions are hence 
becoming more and more important entities. The last section of this chapter will then outline 
the nexus between regional integration and peace. The conclusion will then summarize South 
Africa’s role in such a nexus. The objective of this chapter is to evaluate South Africa’s role 
in addressing the research question: What contribution could Spatial Development initiatives 
make towards the Southern African region’s regional integration objective. 
 
4.2 The case of Spatial Development Corridors 
The South African Growth, Empowerment and Redistribution (GEAR) policy sets out the 
macroeconomic stage in which the SDI noticeably plays out. The SDIs were first launched by 
the South African government in 1995. The economic vision of South Africa, in SADC, is to 
transform the fourteen countries of Southern Africa from operating as individual fragmented 
markets into a single integrated vibrant and globally competitive market characterised by free 
movement of goods, services, capital and labour (Soderbuam, 2006). Jouren (1998) in 
(Soderbuam; 2006:160) argues that the SDIs are targeted, short term and often extremely 
comprehensive initiatives, designed to facilitate global competitiveness, regional cooperation 
and a more diversified ownership. The SDIs are focused on high-level support in socio-
economic areas especially where inherent economic potential exists. SDIs seek to revitalize 
and rehabilitate the primary infrastructure and the maximization of investment in social 
development. They have been characterized as an extension of the neo liberal economic 
orthodox (Hentz; 2005:36) A key component of SDIs initiative is the move away towards 
international competitiveness, regional co-operation, and a more diversified ownership base, 
SDIs are based on four objectives namely to rehabilitate the primary infrastructure network 
along the corridor, notably road, rail, port and border posts, with the participation of the 
private sector in order to have minimum impact on public expenditure (SDI, 2000 and de 
Beer & Arkwright, 2003). SDIs set out to maximize investment in both the inherent potential 
of the corridor area and in the added opportunity that the infrastructure rehabilitation will 
create, including the provision of access to global capital and facilitation of regional markets 
and regional economic integration (SDI, 2000 and de Beer & Arkwright, 2003). SDIs set out 
to maximize social development, employment opportunity and increase the participation of 
historically disadvantageous communities (SDI, 2000 and de Beer & Arkwright, 2003). And 
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to ensure sustainability by developing policy, strategies and frameworks that should ensure a 
holistic, participatory and environmentally sustainable approach to development (SDI, 2000 
and de Beer & Arkwright, 2003). 
 
South African driven SDI span national boarders and the most visible ones currently are the 
Maputo Development Corridor (MDC) between South Africa and Mozambique (MDC 
includes, Swaziland, Zimbabwe and Botswana), and the Lubombo Initiative between South 
Africa, Mozambique and Swaziland. Under consideration is the extension of the Rustenburg 
SDI to include the Trans-Kalahari transport corridor between Namibia and Botswana 
(Soderbuam; 2006:161). Ten development initiatives have been designated and have already 
generated around 661 investment projects valued at ZAR83-billion (Hentz; 2005:36). The 
institutional structure of the SDI is non-bureaucratic with a minimalist approach to 
institutions. The institutional structure in SDI is kept at a minimum, the main role of the 
institutional structure is too fast-track project implementation. The Maputo Development 
Corridor is the prime example of SDI and it is leading to substantial investments in both 
South Africa and Mozambique (Soderbuam; 2006:160-169). 
 
4.2.1 Management of Spatial Development Initiatives 
The rationale for economic integration in Southern Africa is based on the premise that 
economic integration can yield greater developmental benefits by the collective use of 
economic policies. The SDI’s therefore have been highlighted as a neo-liberal approach to 
regionalism (Hentz; 2005:37). South Africa’s SDI programmes are coordinated by the 
Overall SDI Coordination Committee (OSDICC), which initially fed into the inter-ministerial 
Cabinet Investment Cluster (CIC) (Soderbuam; 2006:171). 
 
The CIC is made up of ministers whose portfolios include infrastructure and economic 
development. The meeting of the OSDICC is attended by all SDI project managers as well as 
a number of senior representatives of national government department and parastatals, such 
as the Developmental Bank of South Africa, Investment South Africa, the IDC, Transnet, 
Portnet, Spoornet and the CSIR (Soderbuam; 2006:160). The OSDICC was split into two 
entities: the coordination committee which is resource based SDI’s and the Regional SDI 
Committee (RESDIC). In 2004, in order to underpin the restructuring of SADC institutions, 
the SADC Secretariat prepared a Regional Indicative Strategic Development Plan (RISDP) 
(Soderbuam; 2006:160). The purpose of the RISDP is to deepen regional integration in 
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SADC, and to provide SADC Member States with a consistent and comprehensive 
programme of long-term economic and social policies. Each SDI has a project manager (one 
in each participating country), who is to put together temporary technical teams, made up of 
officials from government and parastatals as well as consultants and other relevant experts, 
and then promote the project on all levels (Soderbuam; 2006:160). 
 
The SDIs are characterized by the speedy implementation and the removal of bottlenecks and 
the constraints to investment, which are often infrastructure in nature or trade-related. The 
initial phases are driven by the central government institutions and the different line 
departments (Soderbaum, 2006). In the last stage of implementation, in the so-called exit 
phase, the administration should be decentralized to the provincial and local institutions, 
particularly their investment promotion agencies whose main brief is to facilitate new 
investment in the region (Soderbaum, 2006). The Department of Trade and Industry is among 
the key departments identified in South Africa to facilitate and implement the aims and 
objectives of SDI projects. The department acts as a catalyst for trade and economic 
development on the continent to alleviate poverty. SDIs programmes recognize the need for 
infrastructure, industrial and skills development, and its impact on the continent’s ability to 
become fully integrated into the global economy. President Thabo Mbeki in 1998 stated that: 
“focusing on areas of untapped potential SDIs facilitate regional integration by promoting 
investment, infrastructure development, and employment and wealth creation” (DBSA, 
1998). The South African government has embarked on a number of SDIs in the country and 
the success and failures of which can be transferred to projects aimed at regional renewal. 
These include: Industrial - KwaZulu-Natal and Fish River SDIs by November 1998, the Fish 
River SDI had inspired nine new commercial operations, which created 500 new jobs. New 
firms invested R156 million in the Eastern Cape after it opened. The Agro-tourism sector 
produced the Lubombo SDI and Wild Coast SDI. The department of transport and later the 
Department of trade and industry facilitated the development of the Maputo Development 
Corridor. The Industrial development zones (IDZs), located in Coega, Saldanha and East 
London are also interesting new development zones. The Second Generation SDIs include: 
The Gauteng Special Economic Zone (SEZ) focuses on high technology manufacturing, 
information technology, telecommunications, food processing, cultural activities (DTI, 2009 
and Spatial Development Initiatives, 2010). 
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The Inga dam project represents untapped spatial development potential in Southern Africa. 
Its capacity to produce hydroelectricity of its magnitude could not only foster regional 
development but transform the framework of the current regional political economy. 
Hydroelectricity represents the future in research and technology and could prove to be the 
turning point in regional and global productive forces in the quest for sustainable energy. 
 
“Over the past ten years, our involvement in world affairs has been premised on the view that the 
strength of our nation depends on the strength of the entire continent” (Foreign Minister 
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, June 2004:3). 
 
 Southern Africa like their counterparts in other parts of the continent, are faced with the 
problem of having to provide for their common security. The major problem however has 
been its lack of efficient leadership in organizing other states in the region to connect their 
resources and revitalize developmental potential for the collective security and development 
of Southern Africa. There is the need for a hegemonic state that is willing to provide an 
alternative platform for development towards the creation of a security community. A 
regional hegemon would have the potential to mobilize other member states in formulating 
consistent and uniform policies aimed at addressing common problems such as HIV/AIDS, 
infant mortality and unemployment. The SDI’s objectives in SADC is for member states to 
have achieved macroeconomic stability, including stable and low inflation and debt 
sustainability; pursued sound economic policies; and reinforced governmental and non 
governmental institutions. South Africa’s role is to facilitate: public-private partnerships 
(PPPs); identify inherent economic potential; rapid planning and delivery; restructuring the 
regional economic space; generating sustainable employment; maximizing private sector 
investment and exploiting South Africa’s under-utilized spatial and economic advantages 
(DTI; 2009). 
 
4.3 The Maputo Development Corridor 
The MDC was launched in May 1996 at an official ceremony in Maputo attended by the 
presidents of Mozambique (Chissano) and South Africa (Mandela). The Development 
Corridor came to life when in August 1995, the ministers of transport of Mozambique and 
South Africa met to set in motion a plan to establish transport infrastructure between the port 
of Maputo, Mpumalanga and Gauteng. The development of the Corridor was to facilitate the 
easy access to the Indian Ocean for land locked South African provinces and Zimbabwe. The 
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MDC grew and established itself as a hub to rehabilitate the core infrastructure along the N4 
with minimum impact to road, rail, port, energy, border post (Thomas; 2009:5). The MDC set 
to maximize investment in both the inherent potential of the corridor area and in the added 
opportunities which the infrastructure rehabilitation created (Thomas; 2009:5). Regionally the 
MDC set out to ensure that the development impact of its investment is maximized, 
particularly the incorporation and to the benefit of disadvantaged communities. Fourthly, to 
ensure sustainability by developing policy, strategies and frameworks that encompasses a 
holistic, participatory and integrated approach to development (SATCC; 2001:11). Being the 
shortest link to an export harbour for South Africa’s industrial heartland, the MDC rapidly 
became a major intersection for Southern Africa’s linkages with the world economy. Once 
established the MDC facilitated the significant speeding up of the rate of employment 
creation, both formal and informal along the corridor. The prospectus for the MDC includes 
admirable developmental commitments and environmental awareness which suggest a basis 
for a popular form of regionalism. For instance, the MDC’s ‘Strategic Context’ and ‘Vision’ 
states that: the re-establishment of the Witbank-Maputo axis will significantly enhance the 
underlying conditions for development along its entire length ... The development corridor 
will also present opportunities to address the important (corridor and wider regional area) 
issues of sustainability (natural resource use, refined industrial processes etc.), poverty and 
access to basic needs and social services (DBSA, 1997). 
 
The key infrastructure investments generated by the MDC includes the following (Thomas: 
2002 in Thomas; 2009:5): The N4 Maputo Toll Road, a 30 year concession awarded in 1997 
to the Trans African Concessions consortium (Trac), and estimated at ZAR1.5 billion at the 
time. The management agreement with Liverpool’s Merseyside Docks and Harbor Company 
to upgrade and operate the Maputo Port for an estimated US$65 million initial investment 
(Thomas; 2009:5). Thirdly the construction by the two ministries of two high voltage 
electricity lines from Duvha (near Johannesburg) to Maputo through South Africa-
Mozambique electricity utilities Joint Venture(Motraco) (Thomas; 2009:5). Lastly the 
development of the Pande/Temane gas field in Mozambique and the construction of a 
pipeline to South Africa (US$1.4bn) by SASOL (South Africa) and ENH (Mozambique) 
(Thomas; 2009:5). 
 
Other investments include: The anchor investment into the Mozal Aluminum Smelter at 
Maputo by SA’s Billiton (now BHP Billiton) in a joint venture with SA’s IDC (about 
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US$1.5bn for phase I and a further $1bn in phase II) (Thomas; 2009:5). The third phase of 
this project is now under consideration; the Beluluane Industrial Park, a 600 hectare industrial 
free zone development adjacent to the Mozal plant, is attracting a mix of foreign, regional 
and local investors into heavy industry, manufacturing and hi-tech businesses; A US$2bn 
iron & steel complex in Matola, based on SA ore and Mozambican gas, is currently being 
assessed (Thomas; 2009:5). 
 
The development of health and educational facilities to meet the demands of this growth has 
multiplying effects. Job creation along the development corridor entails the booming and 
establishment of local economies to cater for the workers, community and general project 
support facilities. Development Corridors offer answers to issues of unemployment, 
investment opportunity and general infrastructure development. 
 
4.4 The case of Peace Parks 
This section will continue by discussing another important aspect of SDI’s; the environmental 
field. This study emphasizes the need to address environment and development together, as 
one option for reducing poverty and moving towards a sustainable development path. This is 
a huge area to cover and this section will begin by discussing a short overview of the state of 
the environment, before focusing more specific on the regional phenomenon of Transfrontier 
Conservation Areas, often referred to as Peace Parks, and linking this to the issue of socio-
economic development in the SADC region (Fair Trade in Tourism South Africa (FTTSA), 
2009). Through the Peace Parks, the importance of the community level is increasingly being 
understood, particularly the need to realize the interconnectedness between the processes at 
the community, national and regional levels for purposes of sustainable development. 
 
First to give a background of the importance of wildlife: tourism is one of the largest income 
sources for the Southern African countries, and the SADC region is expected to become one 
of the major tourist destinations in Africa (SADC, 2008). Tourism is a priority sector, and 
Southern African nations are therefore doing everything possible to ensure a flourishing 
tourism industry in order to boost economic growth in the region and ensure improved living 
standards of the people (FTTSA, 2009). Travel and tourism’s average contribution to GDP in 
SADC increased from 3.3percent in 2006 to 9.1percent in 2008 (FTTSA; 2009:i). However 
expenditure on tourism differs drastically from country to country, with Seychelles allocating 
the highest percentage of its expenditure (22.2 percent) followed by Mauritius (16.1percent). 
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In contrast, South Africa receives the majority of tourists in SADC, but spends the smallest 
percent of its total government expenditure on tourism (.5percent) (UNWTO, 2008). 
 
Tourism is a focal point for many of the countries’ strategies to reduce high unemployment 
rates. An example from Zambia can be given: It has been estimated that one job is created for 
every 10 tourists who visit the country (Relly; 2001:2and Salomao in SADC outlook, 2008). 
In most of the southern African countries, tourism is mainly wildlife based. Thus, when 
looking at the state of the environment, wildlife is of outmost importance with regard to the 
general socio-economic development of the Southern African regions. The SADC recognizes 
that natural resources are critical to regional development and poverty eradication, and hence 
has enshrined “sustainable utilization of natural resources and effective protection of the 
environment” in the revised SADC Treaty (Salomão in SADC outlook; 2008:v). Regional 
leadership in the management of natural resources could yield substantial returns. Water 
projects along the peace parks could offer an opportunity to generate income for new crop 
production for local communities while ensuring that sustainable use of shared water 
resources. The need to establish local water projects and woodlots to combat deforestation 
offer both localized employment opportunities and combat grievances from local 
communities who feel marginalized from the use of natural resources based in their 
communities. 
 
4.4.1 Managing the wildlife 
According to the World Wildlife Foundation (WWF), by far the most significant threat to the 
environment is habitat loss, with the second biggest threat being utilization, primarily for 
food and medicine (SADC Annual Report:2004). About 70 percent of the region’s population 
depends on land for food, income and employment (SADC Annual report: 2004). An 
overview of the state of wildlife in Africa is as follows: The Chimpanzee population is 
estimated to have been around 2 million living in African forests only a century ago, now it is 
between 150 - 250 000, and it is considered to be endangered. The rapid decline in population 
is mostly due to habitat loss and illegal hunting. The mountain Gorillas are also one of the 
most endangered species today, with a population of fewer than 700. They have been 
vanishing quickly due to intensive illegal hunting and habitat loss. The black rhino is 
critically endangered, whilst white rhinos have status as near threatened. The population 
appeared to be stable a few years ago, but another upsurge in poaching in the recent years has 
placed them in jeopardy once again. Finally, the population of lions has been halved in the 
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last three decades, with an estimated population now being between 30 and 50 000, mostly 
due to a declining prey base, as well as killings by humans in defense of their livestock herds 
(SADC environmental outlook, 2008). 
 
This list goes on, however, the main point here is that habitat loss, and what is called Human 
Wildlife Conflict are the major reasons for the current state of the African wildlife. Today, 
with the frontiers of African development expanding further and further into what used to be 
wildlife habitat, humans and animals are being forced to share the same geographic spaces 
alongside one another. Humans as a result lose harvest crops, livestock and damaged property 
due to industrial development and wildlife co-habiting the same space. At the same time, 
wildlife populations in many areas have decreased dramatically due to them being targeted 
and “cleared” out of the new living areas due to urbanization and residential expansion. 
Another issue of concern, is that Southern Africa is one of the most popular regions for 
canned hunting (often called trophy hunting), where wild animals are raised in confined, 
fenced areas as game. Trophy hunting has become a lucrative industry in Southern Africa. 
Lion breeders make around US$25,000 on average for each lion a hunter shoots. The last 
issue of concern is the high levels of poaching in most of Southern Africa, and the illegal and 
unsustainable trade that follows from it 
 
4.4.2 SADC response to wildlife challenges  
In 1999, all SADC members signed a protocol on Wildlife Conservation and Law 
Enforcement, as its platform for regional cooperation on wildlife management, where some 
of the main points are that: Member States have the sovereign right to manage their wildlife 
resources and the corresponding responsibility to sustainable use and in conserving these 
resources. A major SADC goal is to promote sustainable use of natural resources and 
effective protection of the environment. SADC is aware that the conservation and sustainable 
use of wildlife in the region contribute to sustainable economic development. The survival of 
wildlife depends on the perceptions and development needs of people living with wildlife. 
The regional management of wildlife and wildlife products will promote awareness of its 
socio-economic value (SADC, 1999). 
 
SADC recognizes the need to develop its resource bases in an ecologically sustainable way. 
Environmental rights in the Wildlife Conservation and Law Enforcement protocol are seen as 
fundamental to the regions’ economic development. SDIs development could further 
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facilitate the regionalization of utilities such as water, energy and hydroelectric power. The 
Inga dam along the Peace Parks could be used to generate energy that would be distributed by 
a regional power utility, regulate equitable regional consumption and ensure sustainable 
utilization of natural resources in SADC. Hydro electricity generated by such a SDI would 
overtake coal energy as the primary energy source in SADC aiding the global fight against 
emissions. The dam also has potential to generate wind farms. Currently there are two 
hydroelectric projects established in the Inga; Inga I and Inga II which is slightly bigger. 
Accurate figures for the Grand Inga project however remain elusive as the development of 
the project has mainly been kept secret. Unofficial figures though estimate that the Grand 
Inga project would have installed capacity to generate 40,000 Mega watts (World Rivers 
Review, 2001). 
 
4.4.3 Transfrontier Conservation Areas  
One of the direct outcomes of the SADC cooperation on wildlife and the protocol signed by 
most members, is the relatively new phenomenon of Transfrontier Conservation Areas, also 
known as Peace Parks. Kgalagadi is Africa’s first peace park, officially opened by the 
presidents of Botswana and South Africa in May 2000, and today there are 9 such 
conservation areas in the SADC region, with more expected to come in the near future (Relly, 
2001). The world’s largest conservation area was established in 2006; that is the Kavango-
Zambezi Transfrontier Conservation Area, crossing the borders of Angola, Botswana, 
Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe. It is almost the size of Italy, and it includes 36 national 
parks, game reserves, and community conservancies, in addition to covering numerous major 
attractions such as the Victoria Falls (Sikuka, 2010 and Relly; 2001:3). An NGO called the 
Peace Parks Foundation is in charge of the overall management of the parks. The Peace Parks 
Foundation (PPF) has a presence in most SADC countries, particularly where Peace Parks 
have been established or are being developed (FTTSA; 2009:58). The PPF is involved in 
tourism and the training of local communities in Peace Parks (FTTSA; 2009:58). However, 
its current role is limited to coordinating the responsibilities between private interests, local 
communities and National and Provincial park authorities. Peace Parks could be better 
coordinated if a regional development plan was crafted around them, this would incorporate 
the PPF as it is already funded by the governments of the Southern African states along with 
private sponsors.  
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The Peace Parks have the potential if sufficient leadership is provided to boost local 
economies. Local people could be trained as rangers, guides and general facilitators in the 
vast areas of the Peace Parks. Small scale agriculture could develop as a result of additional 
income in the communities. A culture of entrepreneurship, where old people tell stories to 
visitors and young people who would previously be unemployed would take tourist on hikes 
along the terrain. Many communities also produce art and craft and display their products 
along the roads for motorists to stop by and purchase (FTTSA; 2009:49). Such partnership 
would facilitate safer tourist activities in the region and a self sustained industry amounts 
local communities. Long term objectives of such developments would assist in the reduction 
of informal settlements in urban areas, as employment opportunities offer subsistence in rural 
areas. Wildlife would indirectly benefit from local population’s seeing them more as a source 
of livelihood and would thus lead to the reduction of poaching and wild life killings in 
general. 
 
Self sufficiency in Peace Park communities would further extent the legitimacy of 
governments who otherwise are only significant and operational in urban populations. Today, 
while most Western states fit Weber’s (1919) influential definition of the state, Africa and 
most developing world state do not fit this definition (Jackson & Rosberg; 1982:19). It is 
commonly assumed that the state has an interest in protecting its territory, its population, and 
for it to promote some form of development towards stable societal structures (Bøås, 2003). 
In a number of countries in SADC, the states themselves do not seem to fit the pattern of state 
sovereignty in that they often do not control vast spaces of their territories and their rural 
populations (Bøås, 2003). There are other actors that substantially influence community 
relations in rural communities, such as clan systems and traditional authorities. States such as 
Zimbabwe and the DRC suffer from a lack of capacity to deal with threats to the achievement 
of the presumed objectives of the state, be they the territorial unity of the state; the 
maintenance of a bureaucracy or the safety and development of their population (Bøås, 
2003). In addition, in certain cases such as the DRC, states not only lack the capability, but 
also a willingness to perform their basic functions as states, in that they abandon their 
obligations to guard the territory and foster security through development. Forgoing such 
responsibilities would at times yield more profit and opportunity to state elites, the regime 
itself or other non-state actors who claim to represent the grievances of people (Collier, 
1998). 
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The potential multiplier effects of Peace Parks are numerous and they include the possible 
curbing of malnutrition in the coordinated use of natural resources. Peace Park management 
could incorporate local communities in developing subsistence farming along the parks. This 
in turn could foster a sense of ownership by local communities, leading to a restructured 
focus on the question of land reform in SADC. Money generated from community based 
businesses could also be used to fund education for children, further diversifying household 
income and production in general. 
 
4.4.4 Positive aspects of Peace Park cooperation within SADC 
Peace parks are seen as visionary, politically unifying and ecologically sensible. So far it 
seems to be a successful process of partnerships between governments over borders, and the 
private sector (Relly; 2001:1). Conservation and tourism is expected to be one of the main 
vehicles for socio-economic development in southern Africa, and the vision behind linking 
protected areas and ecosystems across international borders is to stimulate job creation, 
biodiversity conservation and regional peace and stability. Wildlife will prosper in the parks, 
and this is expected to increase tourism. A recent study by the Peace Parks Foundation and 
the Southern African Development Bank predicts that the conservation area could attract as 
many as eight million tourists to the region annually, as well as creating employment for 
thousands of people (FTTA; 2009). Thus, some believe that the Peace Parks will present a 
new dawn for socio-economic development in the SADC region, also resulting in deeper 
integration and cooperation among member states. All of this however is premised on the 
effective management and visional leadership of the member states in general but mostly on 
South Africa specifically as it has the economic capacity to trigger such development. Private 
capital in South Africa would also see regional cooperation along Peace Parks as 
advantageous as it would mean securing energy for business particularly and for private 
consumption generally. 
 
4.4.5 Negative aspects of Peace Park cooperation 
However, not all SADC members are convinced that the concept is appropriate, because of 
reasons such as establishment, infrastructure and management costs, incorporation of existing 
communities, political fall-outs, joint management consensus and resource utilization (Relly; 
2001:2).  
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The major question is if the creation of these mega-reserves will bring proportionate 
increases in tourist numbers or financial economies of scale? From a SADC perspective – the 
challenge is to increase the gross number of tourists to the Southern African peace parks, 
rather than to reshuffle the travel habits of the existing volumes, which would result in a zero 
net gain for the region (Relly; 2001:2). 
Finally, Peace Parks face their biggest challenge in adopting satisfactory methods of finding 
consensus with human populations. Land claims, contested boundaries, tribal rights and so 
forth, could put serious brakes on the parks’ initiatives if not managed appropriately right 
from the start. 
 
4.5 SADC common points of integration 
One of the most important environmental issues in the region is water (Heyns et al, 2008). 
Water currently figures centrally in a variety of regional development initiatives, in the form 
of growth corridors (Beira, Maputo, Trans-Kalahari) and cross-border initiatives 
(transfrontier parks). Numerous SADC protocols (on trade, energy, tourism, water resources, 
labour) seek to enshrine in law the formal and informal practices that will build up around 
these activities. Interstate and inter-institutional discussions have been under way for some 
time regarding the possibility of drawing water from the Zambezi River and possibly the 
Congo River further north. Informed opinion considers the Democratic Republic of Congo’s 
inclusion in SADC to have been hastened by the future promise of that country’s vast natural 
resources, not the least of which are land and water. Regional agreements are clearly of the 
highest importance to avoid conflict over this diminishing resource. Customary international 
water law says that states can use their territorial waters as they please. SADC, however, has 
ratified its own Protocol on Shared Water Resources in 2003 which is much more cautious, 
and relies on information sharing about developments along the rivers. For the Orange River 
in particular ORASECOM is a significant achievement in multilateral agreements (Heyn et 
al, 2008). This is to show that regional cooperation based on trust can work where it is seen 
profitable by its members. Particularly, South Africa has an interest in the above regulation as 
it is at the end of the river and relies on the information. 
 
Another aspect of combining economic integration and other regional issues are the Peace 
Parks, or Transfrontier Parks. The newest addition to the existing nine parks will be 
Kavango-Zambezi which will span over five southern African borders and provide room for 
wildlife and many other tourist attractions such as the Victoria Falls (Sikuka, 2010).  
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This high concentration of attractions is expected to create an entirely new assortment of tourism 
opportunities in southern Africa but also present a new dawn for socio-economic development in 
the SADC region, resulting in deeper integration among Member States (Sikuka; 2010:1). 
 
The Peace Parks represent a future dawn for the region and Africa at large. Academically the 
development of peace parks and their promise for greater regional integration signify that 
economic and environmental protection can go hand in hand. The role of the state remains 
important in such development but the prospect of increased development and profit 
generated by such establishments could see power shifts in the region away from the state 
into transnational resource management institutions set up to manage Transfrontier 
development. The Peace Parks in Southern Africa signify the need to view “regional 
networks, the existence of multiple regionalizing actors and the pursuit of different, 
sometimes overlapping... regional projects in terms of their interconnectedness” (Bøås et al., 
2005:7). 
 
4.6 Spatial Development Initiatives as foundation for Regional Integration 
Efird and Genna (2002:268) conceptualize regional integration as a practice involving a non-
coerced process in which economic coordination and adjustments produce a merger of 
economic and political institutions among countries. The Spatial Development Initiatives 
provide that merge of economic and political institutions needed in Southern Africa for 
creating a security community. The management and running of SDI entails trans-ministerial 
involvement which has the potential to strengthen the SADC parliament. SADC has for some 
time been trying to improve its policy focus and operational efficiency. The Organ for 
Politics, Defence and Security Cooperation (OPDSC) has been trying to create effective 
mechanisms for settling conflicts that have the potential to destablise the region with little 
success. The SDI offer renewed opportunities to resolve regional security dilemmas and a 
concerted attempt to implement the SADC trade protocol, aimed at creating a regional free 
trade area; and facilitating the role of the private sector in promoting economic integration 
(Thomas, 2002). Regional security and integration involves the ability of the entity to 
maintain itself and also depends upon peaceful change among its population. The ideas of 
SDIs espoused above also helps to explain the formation of international organizations, 
which as defined by Rochester (1986:778) refers to a formal arrangement transcending 
national boundaries that provides for the establishment of institutional machinery to facilitate 
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cooperation among member states in the security, economic and social related fields. New 
and exciting studies (Bøås et al, 2005, also Hettne, et al,1999 quoted in Taylor, 2005:148) 
advocate for the inclusion of non-state, and informal arrangements in the process of regional 
integration. 
 
Zwaneburg (2006:488) interprets the definition of regional organization from Article 52 of 
the Charter of the United Nations which refers to “Regional Arrangements or agencies”. In 
this same discussion, Zwaneburg, continues to infer that the region as used in the “Regional 
Arrangements or agencies” suggest that there is a geographical territory implied. Bøås et al 
(2005:8) speak of “re-territorialization” of global/regional flows especially in reference to 
globalization. Zwaneburg (2006:488) quotes Boutros Boutros Ghali (1992), the than 
Secretary General of the United Nations on what encompasses regional organizations as 
including: 
 
“…treaty-based organizations, whether created before or after the founding of the United Nations, 
regional organizations for mutual security and defense, organizations for general regional 
development or for cooperation on a particular economic topic or function, and groups created to 
deal with a specific political, economic or social issue of current concern.” 
 
This definition fits in with the new regionalism approach which takes the form above as 
“regionalism” and “regionalization” as the actual processes that result in forms of 
cooperation, integration, connectivity and convergence (Taylor;2005:148). SADC institutions 
and protocols exist to tackle these issues (e.g. Strategic Indicative Plan for the Organ – SIPO 
- dealing with politics, defence and security, etc.). In the agendas on peace and security, and 
on democracy and good governance, SADC is aligning itself with the African Union (AU) 
and NEPAD initiatives, with 8 SADC Member States joining NEPAD’s African Peer Review 
Mechanism (APRM) on governance. 
 
Here it is worth noting that more than half of those members of the African Union signing up 
for the Peer Review mechanisms are in fact members of SADC, making SADC the “most 
peer-review-aligned region on the continent”. This should serve as a positive indicator of 
regional convergence in the direction of high politics.  
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Crucial areas for regional intervention are conflict resolution (between and within former ‘states’) 
and welfare (in terms of social security and regional balance). The ultimate outcome of this could 
be a ‘region-state’, which in terms of scope can be compared to the classical empires, but in terms 
of political order constitutes a voluntary evolution of a group of formerly sovereign national, 
political units into a supranational security community. (Hettne in Hettne et al. (eds) 1999: 11) 
 
4.7 Current case of SADC Regional Peace and Security 
The SADC has an organ dealing with defense, politics and security cooperation. This organ is 
headed by a Troika comprising representatives (ministerial level) from each of the member 
countries’ ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Security and State Security. This 
Troika is mutually exclusive from the Troika heading the Summit (Aldemann; 2009:30-32). 
SADC as a whole has a secretariat with its headquarters in Gaborone, Botswana. Very 
conspicuously absent in the secretariat’s structure, is the support to the defense, politics and 
security cooperation (Aldemann; 2009:39-40). A view that is also supported by Berman and 
Sams (2002:63) who have observed that the 
 
“…the secretariat is divorced from peace and security domain… the secretariat has no person or 
position dedicated to the ‘political-military or peace and security issues’…”. Further 
developments to the organ have been halted by disagreements among member states over the 
development of a Regional Peace Keeping Training Centre. 
 
As a response to such criticism the SADC summit came up with a Mutual Defence Pact in 
August 2003. Ngoma (2003:13) argues that, the Mutual Defence Pact, is closely associated 
with a non-aggression treaty and regarded as a collective defence strategy by SADC member 
states.  
 
“The Mutaula Defence Pact is viewed as, firstly, having the ability to stop member states from 
promoting hostile activities from each other’s territories, and secondly, encouraging coming to 
each other’s support in such an eventuality” (Ngoma; 2006:13). 
 
Ngoma (2003) emphasizes the non-interventionalist nature of the Mutual Defence Pact and 
state that such an agreement signifies the evolution of a security community within SADC. 
The SADC Pact continually stresses some factors that point towards a peaceful collaborative 
arrangement.  SADC is therefore more cautious than West Africa in seeking to promote 
regional security, reflecting a divided region, with limited experience in building security on 
a regional as opposed to a national basis and the lack of a ‘lead nation’ (Berman & Sams; 
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2002:67). In addition, the absence or non-involvement of the secretariat on peace and defense 
issues, suggests a lower level of institutionalization of the peace and security organ within the 
SADC region. What all this means is that peace and security remain unaddressed. The 
inclusion of SDI management teams in SADC committee’s would facilitate the development 
of a body that focuses on human security. Current trends in Southern Africa reflect a move 
away from traditional security, which SADC remains fixed on, but institutional bodies in the 
region have not adapted to such realities. The SDIs cooperation offers a new form of 
institutional arrangement that can deal with contemporary issues that affect various 
communities across Southern Africa. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
SADC appears to be a ‘seductive model’ of integration. Mc Sweeney (1999:169-171) notes 
that this model reinterpret the concept of spillover in the service of reflexive sociology of 
integration: one which analyses the building of integrated security community as the partly 
unintended product of reflexive agents monitoring their interactions with other agents in 
terms of the impact on interests and identities which are made vulnerable to change. The 
seduction in the model suggests the imbalance of power between South Africa and other 
regional states. The imbalance precisely of management of an integration process, in which 
actors are tempted, led and entangled in a web of relations from which it becomes too costly 
to extricate themselves. All in pursuit of state interest, but it remains clear that the essential 
definition of human agency is intact: the option to do otherwise if one wishes too. Mc 
Sweeney (1999) notes that a security community could never be accomplished without the 
enmeshing of individuals’ choices in a project consciously managed by leadership elites. 
 
Regional integrations alone is not a sufficient condition to the elimination of conflict; there is 
potential risk of conflict especially where states belong to more than one regional 
organization. Cases of overlapping memberships are common on the continent, as can be 
seen with SADC, SACU and COMESA membership (Naidu, Roberts & Alvarenga; 
2009:45). Agency becomes a vital component in the process of regional integration and such 
factors outline why South Africa cannot just be a pivot or partner in the region, but should 
aspire to provide leadership in order to meet the objectives of peace and security first 
espoused by the formation of the regional bloc. 
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Regionalism as a theoretical framework can be understood as being divided into two 
teleological divisions, namely old regionalism and new regionalism. The new regionalism 
“moves away from conventional state-centric and formalistic notions of regionalism... and is 
characterised by the new roles played by civil society, market forces, transnational actors and 
professional and business associations” (Stephan; 2006:271). Within the new regionalism 
itself there are two perspectives found. The first perspective, referred to as “open 
regionalism” calls for the liberalization of trade and implementation of free market principles 
in the region. Open regionalism, “enjoys a dominant status within policy making circles 
today” (Stephan; 2006:272). However, a second new regionalism also emerges, led by writers 
such as Bjoern Hettne (2003), which “attempts to bring the political back” into regionalism. 
This approach is referred to as the “developmental integration approach” and arose with the 
growing realization that economists analyzing regionalism tend to look primarily at market 
factors of production, and “assume away the relevance of institutional and political force” 
(Stephan; 2006:272). 
 
This chapter has outlined the SDIs as the developmental path that South Africa should lead in 
Southern African in order to provide peace and human security. This longer-term perspective 
is crucial to future violence prevention and the promotion of a more peaceful future. SDIs 
involve articulating desirable structural, systemic and relationship goals. These might include 
sustainable economic development, self sufficiency, equitable social structures that meet 
human needs and building positive relationships (Lederach; 1997:77). A description of what 
SDI’s are has been provided and this has been argued has the potential to have broad based 
development in the new regionalism approach. The second section of chapter four has 
outlined the environmental aspect of SDI. The Peace Parks have been argued to have the 
potential to forge strong cooperative institution amongst Southern African states. Peace parks 
transcend state boundaries and have traditionally been associated with cooperation based on 
shared resources. Tourism, specifically the service industry in Southern Africa is huge and 
the spatial development of peace parks entails the cooperation of business, labour and 
community-based organizations. South Africa as the regional hegemon has been discussed 
and its responsibility in providing peace has been outlined through SDI, Peace Parks and 
water resources. Through carefully planned “developmental integration” the prospects for 
regionalism of this kind bring new hope to Southern Africa especially through the increase of 
regional trade and access to large regional and international markets. Further creating large 
politically coherent and stable regions will enable Southern Africa to negotiate from a 
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stronger position. All of this is only possible through developmental regionalism, and not just 
by allowing the market to dictate direction and progress. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusion of the study 
5.1 Introduction 
 
“Like slavery and apartheid poverty is not natural. It is man made and it can be overcome by the 
actions of human beings” - Rolihlahla Mandela 2005 
 
“In the Modern era, broadly speaking, over the past 300 years, world politics has been 
characterized by the structural dominance of one level of political domination, the nation 
state” (Cerny; 2000:623). Today, however, the relevance of nation states as referents is 
diminishing. Regions are continuously being constructed by social practice and discourse, 
and are increasingly being recognized as central features of the world. They not only 
“represent a level of analysis, but also provide a context for addressing development 
problems, building security complexes and related policy initiatives” (Bøås et al., 2005: 168). 
The purpose of this study was to explore the ability of a regional hegemon to achieve peace 
through development. Galtung in the 60s came with the concept of positive and negative 
peace, whereas the latter was described as “absence of violence, absence of war” (Galtung; 
1964:2). The former, which he described as integration of human society is the one which is 
of most interest for this study. The concept of peace is premised on the problem statement 
that many of Southern African problems stem from the relationship communities have with 
the material resources surrounding them. 
 
This study has found that the central task of peace building is to create positive peace, a 
“stable social equilibrium in which the surfacing of new disputes does not escalate into 
violence and war” (Reychler; 2001:12). This study has argued that sustainable peace is 
characterized by the absence of physical and structural violence, the elimination of 
discrimination, and self-sustainability (Reychler; 2001:12). Its aim is to move a given 
population from a condition of extreme vulnerability and dependency to one of self-
sufficiency and well being. Positive peace can be said to be what Bigdon and Korf (2004) 
calls “conflict transformation”. Conflict transformation can according to Bigdon and Korf be 
resolved by searching for causes of conflict, which are deeply rooted in human needs, 
dignity, recognition, safety and freedom (2004:349). Johan Galtung’s (1964, 1969) 
illuminating distinction between positive and negative peace is a useful point of departure to 
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analyze NRA approaches to peace research. Galtung maintains that peace broadly can be 
defined as “absence of violence” (Galtung; 1969:167) and that violence is “the cause of 
difference between the potential and the actual” (Galtung; 1969:168). This approach allows 
Galtung to differentiate between personal and structural violence. Personal violence focuses 
on the individual, whereas structural violence more broadly focuses on whether the societal 
structures people live in enable them to realize their full potentials.  For instance, assuming it 
is avoidable; poverty is an example of structural violence in that it hinders the affected people 
to fulfill their potentials. Thus, Galtung argues that peace research must not only focus on 
eliminating the immediate causes of war (creating negative peace) but also create societal 
structures conducive to long term peace and general welfare (creating positive peace). Peace 
research is thus concerned with the wider goals of development (Gleditsch, 2004). This study 
has argued that human-centred development based on the SDI is the most feasible alternative 
for regional peace and security. 
 
The study was geographically confined to the Southern African region. To facilitate this 
study the following research question was formulated: How is the political economy of 
regionalism apparent in the Spatial development Indicators? and what is South Africa’s role 
as a development partner in Southern Africa? 
 
The political economy of southern Africa has been discussed at length as this has a direct 
correlation to South Africa’s hegemonic role in the region and the achievement of peace 
through development. The study has found that the restructuring of SADC has resulted in an 
organization that has neither the capacity nor the resources to effectively address the 
challenges of regionalization. The restructuring process was basically a political process 
addressing a number of perceived weaknesses linked to the decentralized operations of the 
various sectors in member states and the difficulty of addressing regional challenges from 
decentralized bases. The outcome of the restructuring however is a weakened SADC, where 
it is necessary to reconsider its future role and functions. The study was based on an 
explorative and analytical manner based on literature of southern Africa, and mainly based on 
the analysis of factual data sources. The concept of hegemon and peace were applied as 
departure points for research and the components of the analytical framework new 
regionalism were deductively linked. The case of South Africa was analysed as part of the 
assessment. This study concludes that South Africa’s future relations with Africa will depend 
on how it addresses the multiple ambiguities and contradictions of its engagement and 
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pursues a hegemony that is more firmly grounded in meeting the continent’s development 
and growth challenges. 
 
The study’s primary unit of analysis was South Africa and the level of analysis was Southern 
Africa. SADC programmes reflect poverty reduction, economic growth and regional 
integration strategies. Regional priorities as contained, for example, in the SADC treaty of 
1992, are well reflected in the Spatial Development Initiatives. Regional strategies and 
projects are well conceived but have so far largely neglected the issue of human 
development. The study has found that the enhancement of coherence between South Africa 
and other regional members on commonly shared resources will be a key factor in facilitating 
the future development of Spatial Development projects and addressing human insecurity 
generally. The study has found that South Africa’s regional interventions are generally 
ineffective but remain coherent and poverty oriented. Access to land and per capita food 
productivity will continue to decline unless countries of the region make use of their 
comparative advantages, and vigorously pursue the goal of food security by promoting intra 
regional trade. Most of South Africa’s Spatial Development Initiatives that are regionally 
tailored are consistent with the national poverty reduction strategies (GEAR). 
 
The significance of this study is that the conclusions reached could be used to inform 
government officials and civil organisations interested and involved in the future 
development of Southern Africa. The answers to the research question provide possible 
answers to address the complex issues pertaining to security, development and peace in 
southern Africa. The study addresses the issue of regional development through the 
utilisation of the Spatial Development Initiatives. The issue of the multiplicity of regional 
organizations has however not been seriously tackled, neither by SADC protocols nor this 
study. 
 
5.2 Findings on South Africa’s leadership in SADC 
Habib argues that South Africa on the one hand, has demonstrated hegemonic traits. It has 
been instrumental in fashioning a continental vision in the notion of the African renaissance 
and subsequently NEPAD (Habib; 2003:3). It has been at the forefront of initiatives to 
develop the continent’s institutional capacity especially around the African Union (Habib 
2003:3). It has on occasion, particularly in the case of Lesotho, had the political will to 
intervene aggressively to address hotspots that could destabilise the region (Habib; 2003:3). 
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South Africa, through both its public and private business sector, has been at the forefront of 
investment and economic development in the continent. But it has also demonstrated 
trepidation at performing its hegemonic obligations. The crisis of the DRC is a good 
illustration. There were conflicting perceptions between the 1998 and 1999 SADC summits 
regarding the functionality of the OPDSC. While Pretoria contended that the organ had been 
suspended, Harare maintained that the OPDSC was alive and kicking since it continued to 
execute its mandate through SADC’s Inter-state Security and Defence Committee. 
Conflicting strategies over SADC’s involvement in the DRC conflict further aggravated the 
internal crisis within OPDSC. South Africa and some SADC member States (including 
Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland and Mozambique) preferred preventive diplomacy and 
negotiated settlement of the conflict, while Zimbabwe, Angola and Namibia opted for 
military intervention into DRC in 1998 in support of Laurent Kabila’s government 
(Schoeman; 2000:117). Additionally the assertion of Dos Nascimento, an Angolan political 
figure reveals the political mind set in the region: (Schoeman; 2000:111). 
 
“SADC has never managed to create the same kind of forum for common analysis and political 
discussion of regional issues as we were all used to during the time of the Frontline states. When 
the liberation movements came to power, it should have been possible for us to demand more of 
ourselves in common endeavour to forge a real new unity and to look for common solutions to the 
new challenges. I think that Angola and South Africa could have played the same sort of role as 
motors of the community of Southern Africa, as France and Germany did in forging the European 
Union....”. 
 
The study has evaluated South Africa’s role in the region and has come to the conclusion that 
even though it holds preponderance of power as a regional hegemony South Africa has thus 
far lacked effective leadership skills in tackling regional security concerns. The study has 
consequently argued and recommends that South Africa ought to implement DIRCO strategic 
vision through the development of the SDI. The DIRCO has asserted that it will, over and 
above its normal functions, engage in dynamic partnerships for development and cooperation. 
South Africa has committed itself to  
 
“pushing back the frontiers of poverty and underdevelopment in Southern Africa particularly and 
in Africa generally, based on the continental economic and developmental plan, the New 
Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD). Creating peace and pursuing the peaceful 
resolution of conflicts while contributing to peace efforts in Africa and the world. South Africa 
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will engage in the building of and consolidating strategic partnerships to advancing the country’s 
developmental agenda. It has committed itself to building and reforming African and regional 
institutions”(DIRCO, 2009). 
 
5.3 Regionalism and Scenarios moving forward 
The study has evaluated the potential and actual capacity of South Africa under the 
theoretical framework of NRA. Some of the recommendations from the findings can be 
summed up by the following section. Gareth Le Pere (2004) and the CSIR (2006) have 
crafted possible scenarios for the future development of the region. These range from 
intrastate conflict (Danger!) to an egalitarian, democratically driven regional development 
(Regional Renaissance). In between the two extremes there are scenarios which hint at social 
and political decay which is marked by neo-patrimonialism (Slow Slide and SADC in 
Disarray), a new African consciousness resulting from globalisation and a rift between those 
profiting, and those marginalised from it (Rift Valley), and a region driven by survival, 
competition and hegemonic leadership (Darwin’s shield and Powerhouses) (le Pere; 
2004:107). Finally, both the CSIR and Le Pere envisage a region driven by “private sector 
economic activity” (le Pere; 200:108) in which “regional and economic integration is 
successful” albeit with rising inequality, unrest and environmental disasters (CSIR, 2006). 
 
At this point in time, this study considers the Powerhouse and market driven scenarios most 
probable. South Africa is likely to further its hegemonic ambitions through Free Trade 
Agreements (FTA) like the one with the European Union (EU), and ensure its water needs are 
met. On the other hand, SADC, SACU and COMESA are decreasing tariffs and duties among 
member states and are working towards more economic integration (Lee, 2002 and Blaauw, 
2006).  The future prospects of regional peace and security rely on the ability of South Africa 
to break the cycle of one sided development and focus on broad-based regional development 
as a tool for regional stability, prosperity and ultimately peace.  
 
This study has found that regionalism in the SADC region is somewhat of a two-sided 
approach. There is the current process of “open regionalism” driven by powerful global 
market forces and interests. But similarly there is the optimism of the “developmental 
integration approach” to regionalism, driven by the state to guide markets and effect 
functional political spillovers. The spillovers for regionalism in the Southern African region 
is the ability for the developmental integration approach to redress some of the imbalances 
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that exist in the region. Domestic political concerns are of key importance when considering 
the effectiveness and possibilities of regionalism. South Africa faces significant domestic 
difficulties to open regionalism, because of the neoliberal GEAR strategy adopted by the 
ruling party. 
 
The study further explored literature on sustainable development in chapter three.  In his 
inspiring piece on The State, Democracy, Development in Southern Africa Matlosa (2007) 
outlines what he considers necessary for the region to reach an acceptable level of 
Sustainable Human Development (SHD). SHD measures the longevity (life expectancy at 
birth, state of health), knowledge (literacy rates and enrollment rates), and the standard of 
living (water access, health service accessibility, underweight children under five years old). 
In recent years SHD has seriously declined in Southern Africa due to HIV/Aids, with fifteen 
million people being affected in the SADC region, sadly making it the worst affected region 
in the world (Matlosa, 2007 and le Pere; 2002:40). Matlosa (2007) argues that only a 
“developmental and capable state for socioeconomic process and sustainable democracy” can 
combat this trend. A developmental state consists of four pillars: an ideological one (focus on 
economic development), an institutional one (the actual capacity to implement policies), the 
autonomy to make decisions free from private interests, and strong social anchoring so as to 
cater for its people and not vice versa (Mkandawire, 2001 in Matlosa, 2007). The main point 
being that economic development and a strong state are not mutually exclusive and a 
partnership between the two is the most feasible option to drive socio-economic 
development, especially in the SADC region. 
 
5.4 New Regionalism on Peace and Security  
The New Regionalism Approach was adopted as the theoretical framework that has guided 
this study. This study has found that the unit of analysis itself informs how the phenomenon 
of regionalization in Southern Africa is understood. Regionalization for example can point to 
the fact that larger units than the state have to be considered, and the adoption of the view 
that at the same time non-state actors can have influence in creating regions (Bøås et al. 
{2005a; 2005b} and Hentz, 2003). Bøås challenges the formal aspect of the current 
mainstream conceptualization of regionalism in Southern Africa (2003:31-46). His interesting 
challenge comes by making evident the relevance of the parallel informal regionalization in 
particular when it comes to Africa generally. By analysing the key phenomena of politics 
becoming business, Bøås (2003) criticises and argues for an increasingly observable overlap 
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between the political and economical spheres while trying to understand why and how 
leaders and borders become resilient in the process. Violence in this context has its origins in 
“political issues and questions” (Bøås; 2003:43) that cemented themselves under the new 
conditions of modernity, namely the commoditization of war and the post-Cold War move of 
armed factions away from geo-strategic, ideology-motivated funding towards a reliance on 
the commerce of valuable primary commodities such as alluvial diamonds, oil and coltan. 
 
Hentz (2003) draws attention to the fact that new security issues have arisen that cannot be 
solved on a state level. Instead of seeing the different levels available for analysis as 
ontologically given the unit of analysis is itself a choice of what processes or elements of the 
complex social reality are thought of as important. This contradicts the traditional rationalist 
school that assumes the existence of the state and global level as ontologically given. The unit 
of analysis used to explain the new regionalism is in other words a way of framing the 
qualitatively new phenomenon. That is, of selecting what elements are considered relevant 
and can be engaged during peace building, development and construction of regional 
security.  
 
In its most simple sense of meaning, the region of Southern Africa provides simply for the 
space on which history occurs;it would therefore be apolitical (Laclau in Massey, 1993). 
However, this study has found that, “space is constituted through social relations and material 
social practices” (Massey; 1993:145), and that the Southern African regional space thus must 
be political. This assertion has led to the adoptions by this study of developmental 
regionalism (state-led) in Southern Africa; specifically the argument that South Africa, as the 
regional hegemon, should provide leadership in the development of the region in order to 
have equity and achieve sustainable peace. 
 
A discussion of the implications on regional integration on peace and security in Southern 
Africa would not be complete without discussing the implications of new regionalism 
especially as it affects the region. Reading the literature (Bøås et al, 2005 and Taylor, 2005) 
on the subject gives one a definite idea that peace is going to be an illusion if the implications 
of new regionalism are not taken into account in resolving conflicts. It has become very clear 
that the greatest danger that Africa faces from conflict is conflict itself. As long as there are 
parties benefiting from the conflict, peace will be hard to come by. Taylor (2005:151) asserts 
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this point when he says that“...conflict ridden spaces offer a form of malignant 
competitiveness for both patron and client that can prove highly profitable”. 
 
5.5 Limitations and Recommendations of the study 
The study found difficulty in finding material on the subject matter as the study of new 
regionalism is fairly new and is mostly concentrated on conflict analysis. The developmental 
significance of the new regionalism remains largely neglected. Regional integration generally 
focused on the European experience and studies of regionalism outside North America and 
Europe are few and far in-between. 
 
The second difficulty is the understanding of the theoretical framework itself. For one it 
advocates for moving away from state analysis but its most distinct characteristic is the aspect 
of developmental regionalism which is state led. A lot of criticism can be tabled at the 
methodological foundation of the new regionalism approach, especially its developmental 
aspect. Thirdly, It is generally accepted that there are three dimensions to hegemony. These 
are military dominance, economic dominance and ideological dominance. When we study 
past human action as a guide to future action, the most productive way to organize our 
knowledge into a general system is through structural propositions as they offer historical 
realities (Lane; 1948:359). One of the studies limitations is due to the fact that it mainly 
discussed and focused on the economic dominance of South Africa in the region. The 
economic explanations of South Africa’s development role does have a strong appeal, 
however it has been criticized for being speculative, reductionist, and perhaps most 
importantly, highly misleading. 
 
Its military dominance has been well documented but its ideological dominance regionally 
remains contested. The nature of this study has been founded on the diagnoses that South 
Africa lacks leadership in the Southern African region and tries to provide clarity on starting 
points for effective leadership. Future research could focus on the normative aspect of South 
Africa’s role regionally. Ideological consent is a very important component of hegemony and 
most criticism on South Africa’s hegemony is directed/based on its lack of ideological 
leadership regionally. 
 
The study recommends that these questions be reviewed for future research and incorporated 
in the wider understanding of South Africa’s role in Southern Africa. These include the 
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consequences of the lack of a South African identity that is evident in foreign policy 
decisions in terms of regional and continental engagement. The lack of clearly defined 
national interests means that the foreign policy doctrine of South Africa will remain vague 
and might hinder its foundational strength in region building and South Africa’s membership 
in global forums. A further constraint is the impact of adequate resources for foreign policy 
purposes given the domestic issues and concerns that South Africa still faces. 
 
5.6 Conclusion 
To conclude, this study has outlined some information about SADC that will inform 
development in areas of opportunity such as the Spatial Development initiatives. In so doing 
some of the critical political and socioeconomic characteristics of the region have been 
highlighted. The purpose of the study was to highlight the ability of a regional hegemon to 
achieve peace through development initiatives. The Maputo Development Corridor and the 
Transfrontier Parks were described in order to highlight this new quantitative phenomenon in 
the study of regional security and particularly integration. Challenges of food security, 
various state capacities and HIV/AIDS are still prevalent in the regional and are threats to the 
general development of Southern Africa. An increasingly new challenge to the SADC is the 
issue of environmental degradation confronting the region. Such a threat highlights further 
the need to focus on Peace Parks as increasingly important resources for livelihood and 
development regionally. Lastly, new regionalism thinking has potentially profound and far 
reaching implications on furthering understanding and guidance on Spatial Development 
Initiatives, regional identity and integration. Policy and research should be moving towards 
this thinking to make regional integration and peaceful co-existence a reality. The future of 
the region remains bright; Southern Africa is rich in terms of natural resources and the 
establishment of common developmental values in which broad based development can occur 
remains key. It should be noted though that quite a few states may, due to domestic problems, 
have fewer resources to devote to spatial development corridors and regional cooperation in 
the future. 
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